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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY1
Albania’s mine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) contamination problem is a result
of the 1999 Kosovo conflict. Armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)
laid landmines along both sides of Albania’s border with Kosovo, in the north-eastern
Kukës region.
The Albanian Mine Action Committee and the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE)
were established by the government in 1999. In 2002, the UNDP initiated a capacity
building project to build mine action coordination and monitoring capacity.
By the end of 2007, AMAE was fully nationalised and, in November 2009, Albania
declared the completion of its mine clearance obligations under Article 5 of the AntiPersonnel Mine Ban Convention, several months ahead of schedule.
Albania is one of the few countries with a contamination problem that:
• established national structures to address the problem,
• harnessed international support to build its national capacity,
• developed and implemented realistic plans ahead of schedule with a team of
national staff
Albania also made significant strides in putting in-place sustainable systems and
structures for physical and medical rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors and for
people with disabilities.
One of the main objectives of UNDP’s main goals in supporting Albania was the
promotion of national ownership and the integration of the AMAE within government
structures. This was not achieved however, and administratively, AMAE remained a
UNDP Direct Execution project implementation unit for its duration.
In November 2009, Albania was declared free of mines and ERW. Following completion,
AMAE phased-out most of its operations but did not formally close due to efforts to
assess whether AMAE´s capacity could be used to support the clearance of unexploded
ordnance (UXO) hotspot areas and the Government´s ammunition disposal programme.
In addition to its mine/ERW contamination problem, Albania has a problem with excess
and unstable ammunition in military depots left from the former communist regime.
Over the years, ammunition depot explosions have resulted in deaths, injuries and
1

This case study on Albania is part of a wider study undertaken by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian
Demining (GICHD) and the UN Mine Action Team on transitioning UN-managed and supported mine action
programmes to national ownership. See the following link for more information: http://www.gichd.org/strategicmanagement/transitioning-mine-action-programmes-to-national-ownership/
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displacement. In response to an accident that took place in Gërdec in 2008, the
Government endorsed the demilitarisation2 of all hazardous ordnance by 2013. In 2010,
UNDP´s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery undertook an assessment that
provided guidance on AMAE transition options. The following year, the Government of
Albania and the UNDP formally agreed to use AMAE (renamed the Albania Mine and
Munitions Coordination Office – AMMCO) to monitor and coordinate the clearance of
19 hotspot areas across the country.
It took approximately one year for the Ministry of Defence and the UNDP to formally
approve AMMCO’s mandate, and the question of national ownership and integration
within the government persists. Continuing as a UNDP project implementation unit is
not sustainable and AMMCO´s future is at risk as long as it depends on the support of
the UNDP to sustain it.
Completion of the AMAE’s transition to AMMCO was also slow and beset by delays.
Earlier guidance from the UNDP on programme closure, and the use of mine action
capacity to support wider security-related programmes, could have better facilitated
these transitions. Based on AMAE´s experiences, AMMCO needs to develop a clear
strategy to address integration within the government, sustainability and closure.

2

Demilitarisation refers to “…the complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition, mines and
explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose. Demilitarisation not only involves the final destruction process,
but also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are as critical to
achieving the final result.” South-east European Surplus Arms: State Policies and Practices”, Issue Brief, No.1,
November 2010, Small Arms Survey and The Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR).
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INTRODUCTION
The Republic of Albania is located in the Balkans region, and shares borders with
Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia and Greece. Albania’s population is estimated at 3.15
million, and the country is ranked 70 out of 187 countries on the United Nations (UN)
Human Development Index (HDI), just below the regional HDI average for Europe and
Central Asia. High GDP growth rates in recent years have meant a reduction in poverty.3
However, significant regional and urban/rural disparities exist.
EXCESS AMMUNITION

Stores of ammunition in former military depots, left over from Albania’s former
communist regime, pose a serious safety threat. In 1992, there were over 194,000
tonnes of ammunition in 955 storage depots across the country, in unstable and poorly
maintained conditions.4
Numerous depots exploded during the civil unrest in March 1997, and several minor
explosions have taken place since. The largest and most serious explosion took place in
Gërdec in March 2008, killing 27 people, injuring over 300, and resulting in the
evacuation of over 4,000 residents.5 Following this (which coincided with Albania’s
entry into NATO), the government prioritised ammunition disposal, and launched a
national action plan on excess ammunition.
Today, according to the Albania Mines and Munitions Coordination Office, there are 19
UXO hotspot areas in the country. These are defined as ammunition depots or
abandoned army camps where ammunition explosions have resulted in the areas being
contaminated with UXO. The Albanian Armed Forces (AAF) has conducted surface
clearance in some of these areas, but not according to international humanitarian
standards, and UXO-related accidents have since occurred. According to estimates from
the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE), there have been at least 699 abandoned
explosive ordnance (AXO) casualties, killing 109 people and injuring 590.
Approximately 90 per cent of Albania’s surplus ammunition is reportedly over 40 years
old. Consequently, much of the ammunition has lost its physical and chemical
properties, increasing the likelihood of unplanned explosions. 6 Albania’s Ministry of
Defence classifies at least half of all its ammunition depots to be at high risk of
detonation, due to overstocking and the relocation of old stocks, posing a serious threat
3

Albania – Country Brief 2010, World Bank,
http://www.worldbank.org.al/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/ALBANIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:301421~pagePK:14
1132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:301412,00.html
4
According to ALB-AID, this number was reduced to 63,000 tonnes, as of January 2011.
5
Dangerous Depots: The Growing Humanitarian Problem Posed by Aging and Poorly Maintained Munitions Storage
Sites, Fact Sheet, Summer 2010, US Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs.
6
South-east European Surplus Arms: State Policies and Practices”, Issue Brief, No.1, November 2010, Small Arms
Survey and The Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR).
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to public health and safety.7 Stockpile management and ammunition disposal therefore
remain challenges.
In addition to the excess ammunition problem, the Ministry of Defence has estimated
that, during the civil unrest in 1997, approximately 652,000 weapons of different
calibres, 1.5 billion rounds of ammunition, 3.5 million hand grenades, 3,600 tonnes of
explosive devices and one million mines were looted from military depots. Unofficial
estimates are higher.8 The government has taken action to collect munitions and small
arms and light weapons (SALW) looted from the ammunition depots, and to reduce
surplus aging munitions.9
MINE/ERW CONTAMINATION

Albania’s landmine and UXO problem stems from the 1999 Kosovo conflict, when the
armed forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) laid mines along both sides of
Albania’s border with Kosovo, in its northeastern Kukës region. Cluster munitions strikes
carried out by the FRY Armed Forces and NATO between April and June 1999 also
contributed to the UXO problem.
Non-technical surveys carried out after the conflict identified approximately 15 km2 of
suspected hazardous areas along the Albanian/Kosovo border in the districts of Kukës,
Has and Tropoje.10 A total of 39 villages and approximately 25,000 people were
affected. Over 80 per cent of mine and ERW-related injuries occurred while people were
engaged in livelihood activities, (eg agriculture, herding animals, collecting water).11
Mine/ERW contamination impeded the region’s socio-economic development and
exacerbated its social and economic exclusion from the rest of the country.
On 29 February 2000, Albania ratified the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention
(APMBC) and on 30 November 2009, the Government of Albania fulfilled its obligations
under Article 5 of the APMBC to destroy or ensure the destruction of all anti-personnel
mines in known mined areas, nine months ahead of schedule. Since 2000, through
survey and clearance, Albania has released approximately 16 km2 of land and destroyed:

7

Electronic Mine Information Network, Albania, Summary, http://www.mineaction.org/country.asp?c=195, accessed
July 25, 2011; Paul Holtom, Henry Smith, Bernardo Mariani, Simon Rynn, Larry Attree, Juliana Sokolová. 'Turning the
Page: Small Arms and Light Weapons in Albania', Report on Small arms and security in South Eastern Europe, Center
for Peace and Disarmament Education and Saferworld, 2005.
8
Paul Holtom, Henry Smith, Bernardo Mariani, Simon Rynn, Larry Attree, Juliana Sokolová. 'Turning the Page: Small
Arms and Light Weapons in Albania', Report on Small arms and security in South Eastern Europe, Center for Peace
and Disarmament Education and Saferworld, 2005.
9
The process of destroying the surplus ammunition was an obligation for Albania to join NATO. Due to its efforts in
this regard, Albanian became a NATO member in April 2009
10
Albania National Mine Action Plan for Completion Fulfilling the obligations under Article 5 of the Antipersonnel
Mine Ban Treaty 2007-2010, December 2006.
11
Cluster Munitions in Albania and Lao PDR: The Humanitarian and Socio-Economic Impact. R. Cave, A. Lawson & A.
Sherriff
September 2006, United Nations
2

• 12,452 antipersonnel mines
• 152 anti-vehicle mines
• 4,965 items of UXO
Between 1999 and 2009, national and international support for mine action was
estimated at USD 31.7 million, including in-kind contributions from the government, in
the form of explosives and emergency medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) services.12

12

International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine Monitor, Albania, 2002 – 2010.
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OVERVIEW OF THE ALBANIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ALBANIAN MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

In 1999, the Ministry of Defence first established Albania’s national mine action
programme, followed by an inter-ministerial Albanian Mine Action Committee (AMAC).
AMAC13 functions as Albania’s national mine action authority, overseeing policy-making,
supervising the mine action programme and determining the overall direction of mine
action. Until completion in November 2009, AMAC met regularly, oversaw the national
mine action programme, and facilitated inter-ministerial coordination.14
THE ALBANIAN MINE ACTION EXECUTIVE (AMAE)

The Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) was established to implement, coordinate,
and monitor the national mine action programme, and to serve as the national mine
action centre. However, in March 2002, due to financial difficulties and a lack of
expertise, the Albanian Government agreed that UNDP Albania would provide direct
financial and technical assistance to AMAE, and that AMAC would play an advisory role.
AMAE was then administered as a project unit through the UNDP direct execution (DEX)
capacity building project.
AMAE’s main functions included:
• the development of national mine action standards;
• identifying, surveying, and marking areas contaminated by landmines and UXO
through its mine/ERW operating partners;
• tasking mine action activities;
• collecting, collating, maintaining, and disseminating data on mines and UXO;
• investigating all mine-related incidents and ensuring that appropriate follow-up
activities occurred;
• serving as a liaison and coordination body with national and international
bodies; and accreditation and Quality Management.15
THE ALBANIAN ARMED FORCES

In 1999, the Albanian Armed Forces (AAF), in association with CARE International,
conducted the first general survey of mine/ERW contaminated areas.
13

Chaired by the Deputy Minister of Defence, AMAC includes members from the Ministries of Labour and Social
Affairs, Health, Finance, Foreign Affairs, Education and Economy. UNDP, UNICEF, ITF, donors and the Albanian Red
Cross participate as observers.
14
Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) & Transition Plan, Final Report, UN Bureau of Crisis
Prevention and Recovery, September 2010.
15
Albania National Mine Action Plan for Completion Fulfilling the obligations under Article 5 of the Antipersonnel
Mine Ban Treaty 2007-2010, December 2006.
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Since 2004, the AAF has contributed MEDEVAC support and explosive materials to the
national mine action programme to destroy mines and UXO. It has also been involved in
the destruction of anti-personnel landmine stockpiles through NATO’s Maintenance and
Supply Agency (NAMSA), and in clearing hotspot areas, though not in accordance with
international standards, and UXO-related accidents have since occurred.
OTHER NATIONAL ACTORS

The Kukës hospital plays an important role in providing medical assistance to mine/ERW
survivors and persons with disabilities.
With support from AMAE/AMMCO and the international community, the hospital has
been operating a prosthetics workshop, and providing physiotherapy services that are
unavailable in most parts of the country.
Also in Kukës, the Albanian non-governmental organisation ALB-AID (formerly the
Victims of Mines and Weapons Association) provides risk education and assistance to
victims of mine/ERW accidents and their families, and works on disability and risk
education issues at a national level.
The Albanian Red Cross is also involved in risk education and data collection
countrywide. With support from UNICEF, the Institute of Curricula and Studies (part of
the Ministry of Education) developed materials for teachers and students on risks,
which include information on mines/ERW and small arms and light weapons. These
were piloted in the Kukës region.
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS

The main international actors that have been involved in the Albanian mine action
programme include:
•

Survey and clearance:
o Danish Church Aid (DCA) - since 2004, DCA has been the sole NGO mine/ERW
operator in Albania (see Section 2 for more information on DCA)
o Swiss Demining Foundation (FSD)
o Handicap International (HI)16
o RONCO
o HELP

•

Victim assistance (VA):
o Slovenian Institute for Rehabilitation
o UNDP

16
Handicap International planned to undertake clearance however following a training accident in 2004, they were
forced to suspend operations and eventually leave Albania.

5

o
o
o
o

ITF Slovenia
HI
ICRC/Special Fund for Disabled
UNICEF

•

Mine Risk Education (MRE):
o ICRC
o ITF
o UNICEF

•

Stockpile destruction:
o NATO
o NAMSA

EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION PROGRAMME17
START UP (1999 – 2001)

Immediately after the Kosovo conflict, the AAF conducted rapid surface clearance in
Kukës to reduce civilian casualties. The work, however, was not carried out in
accordance with IMAS, and the area had to be re-cleared. The AAF also carried out a
non-technical survey, which was further confirmed by CARE-funded independent
surveys.18
The government formed AMAC and AMAE in 1999, and international mine/ERW
operators started conducting clearance operations in 2000, starting with RONCO and
followed by HELP, DCA and FSD.
In September 2001, a UNDP assessment found that AMAE lacked capacity in key areas
and that AMAC was barely functioning. The assessment found that the survey and
clearance operations undertaken during this period were largely unrecorded and
uncoordinated, with disappointing clearance rates, variable quality, and duplication.
Recommendations were as follows:
• for capacity development for AMAE and AMAC, particularly in regard to AMAE’s
planning and management capacity and its ability to comply with IMAS and
undertake quality assurance,19
• a full technical survey,
• administrative support for AMAE,
17

See Annex 1 for a timeline of key events.
Republic of Albania. Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Albania, 30
November 2009.
19
UNDP and Government of Albania. Capacity Building for Mine Action in Albania, ALB/02/001, 2001.
18
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• staff-training,
• information management support.
STEADY PROGRESS (2002 – 2005)

In April 2002, following a request from the Government of Albania, the UNDP initiated a
capacity building project to build mine action coordination and monitoring capacity.
With EC funding, a 21-month technical survey was carried out to obtain a more accurate
assessment of the location of minefields and battle areas in the contaminated districts
of Has, Tropoje and Kukës.
The project had two main objectives:
1) to conduct technical survey and clearance of mined and battle areas in Kukës;
and
2) to provide technical and managerial training to national staff for the future
establishment of a national demining organisation.
Initially, Handicap International (HI) got the contract for technical survey. However, in
May 2004, during a HI training lecture, there was a serious accident with newly
recruited deminers, resulting in two deaths and several injuries. HI suspended its
activities and eventually left Albania.
DCA then won the technical survey and clearance contract and the project began in
2005. Capacity development of national staff was an important aspect of the project,
with DCA aiming to hand responsibility for the planning, management, execution and
supervision of the demining teams over to national staff eventually. As lack of funding
had also forced FSD to leave the country, DCA became the sole mine/ERW operator
working in Albania from 2004.
IMSMA was set up in 2000. In 2003, an IT advisor was recruited, database training was
provided to all staff, and the use of IMSMA became a priority. An AMAE regional office
was established in Kukës, including an integrated quality management section for
quality control and quality assurance of all mine action operations.20 Albania developed
its own national mine action standards based on IMAS soon after.21
Albania’s first national mine action plan was developed for 2003-2005. It called for the
phasing-in of government responsibility by 2004-2005, when it was expected that only
low priority areas would remain.22

20

Prior to September 2002, no quality management system was in place.
Republic of Albania. Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, Albania, 30
November 2009.
22
ICBL. Landmine Monitor, Albania, 2003.
21
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COMPLETION IN SIGHT (2006 – 2009)

During this period, AMAE focused on completing the clearance of all known mined
areas, as outlined in Article 5 of the APMBC.
UNDP support for completion, through the Completion Initiative, was vital, particularly
in helping mobilise donor support. To strengthen national capacity, UNDP also
continued to provide AMAE with advisors in technical and victim assistance, as well as in
quality management. The victim assistance advisory position was terminated in 2006,
and the chief technical advisor/project manager position the following year. From 2008
onwards, UNDP support for AMAE was primarily financial, mainly covering salaries and
running costs, and by this point, all of AMAE’s managers and staff were nationals.
In 2007, there was less than 2 km2 of land requiring clearance remaining. A UNDPcommissioned evaluation23 considered it too late at this stage to spend time and energy
trying to integrate AMAE into the Ministry of Defence. Given that completion was in
sight and there was no clear plan in place to use mine action capacity for other purposes
after completion, the evaluation recommended that AMAE instead focus its efforts on
completing its clearance obligations and closing down. No further efforts were taken to
integrate AMAE in government.
The March 2008 Gërdec ammunition depot explosions were a turning point for AMAE,
who were asked by AMAC to contribute to the overall response to the explosions during
the emergency phase. The AAF’s response indicated constraints in coordination and
emergency explosive ordnance disposal (EOD). AMAE assisted by mobilising two DCA
teams, with emergency clearance support from the German Government, and worked
with ALB-AID and the ARC to deliver emergency risk education in affected communities.
Despite the fact that completion was clearly in sight, and that there was a clear need to
use mine action capacity to support the clearance of UXO contamination in hotspot
areas, no decision was taken by the Government of Albania at this point in time on the
future role of AMAE.
In December 2008, AMAC, in cooperation with UNDP, presented a revised national mine
action plan for completion in 2009–2010. The plan specified that AMAE would continue
to coordinate and monitor mine action activities until March 2010, when it would shift
to the EOD Response Section in the Ministry of Defence. In November 2009, the
Government of Albania met its article 5 obligations, several months ahead of schedule –
a significant achievement for the government, AMAE and its international supporters.
Box 1. Findings from evaluations
The 2007 UNDP evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme concluded that the
23

See Box 1 for a brief summary of the main evaluation findings.
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programme was comprehensive, well coordinated and well received by all key
stakeholders. Donors interviewed by the
Evaluation Team unanimously expressed that their funds were used efficiently and
effectively. This was viewed as a worthy achievement, considering the complexity of
managing a mine action programme, and the remoteness and poor infrastructure of
the Kukës region, where the landmines are located. At that time, the programme had
made steady progress, having cleared 87 per cent of the mined area, provided
assistance to those injured by the mines, and educated the people in Kukës about the
risks involved with landmines and other remnants of war.
In 2010, an internal assessment conducted by UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and
Recovery (BCPR) concluded that AMAE had directly contributed to the success of the
Government of Albania´s priorities and international commitments in relation to
landmines and ERW, including cluster munitions. Key indicators of AMAE´s success
included:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

“All known hazardous areas cleared before APMBT and CCM treaty deadlines.
A systematic and effective risk education programme reducing the number of mine
or cluster munitions casualties to zero since 2005.
A consistent and effective focus on accident survivors and their long term
rehabilitation.
An established and effective relationship with the ministries of Labour and Social
Affairs, and Health.
Effective coordination structures promoting collaboration between implementing
agents, government, donors and international actors.
Established effective working relationships with local authorities and communities.
Effective integrated approach undertaken combining clearance with community
liaison, risk education and technical survey activities.
Consistent and adequate funding has been achieved for the programme, and
donors having indicated their high degree of confidence in AMAC and AMAE.
Sound accreditation procedures, ensuring only competent organisations undertake
mine clearance work.
Effective quality management procedures and standards providing confidence in
the quality of mine clearance work.
Sound information management system with the potential to be adapted to
demilitarisation and hotspot clearance.
Effective planning mechanisms that enable time-bound targets and milestones to
be set.
The presence of committed, motivated, technically competent and knowledgeable
staff within AMAE, who work without international technical advisors.
A surplus of equipment ready to be deployed on future programmes.
Through AMAC, an effective and trusted interministerial coordinating body, in
9

conjunction with Demilitarisation Committee.”24

BEYOND COMPLETION (2010 TO PRESENT)

Completion, while a clear success, inevitably prompted renewed questions about the
future role of AMAE.25 In late 2009, the Albanian Government and the UNDP began to
discuss the option of using AMAE to address residual ERW contamination and surplus
ammunition. An internal assessment conducted by the UNDP and carried out by
specialists from the Bureau for Crisis Response and Recovery (BCPR) in August 2010
argued that the closure of AMAE would be a loss to Albania’s development and
disarmament communities, and to Albania’s capacity to address its residual mine/ERW
threat and support mine/ERW survivors.
The focus of AMAE’s activities in 2010 and 2011 was on victim assistance, in particular
on:
•
•
•
•
•

emergency assistance and ongoing healthcare
physical rehabilitation
provision of prostheses
social and psychological support
socio-economic reintegration

These activities were carried out with national and international partners.
In November 2010, the ministries of Health and Defence, in association with AMAE,
organised a national victim assistance workshop to assess progress in victim assistance
and to develop a long term national plan in line with the Cartagena Action Plan.26 AMAE
also provided support to the Government of Albania, which was the chair of the APMBC
in 2011, and reported on progress under key disarmament-related conventions.
In March 2011, AMAE was renamed the Albania Mine and Munitions Coordination
Office (AMMCO). This new name better reflected its new mandate of monitoring and
coordinating unexploded ordnance hotspot clearance operations, alongside its existing
mine/ERW reporting obligations under the APMBC, and its victim assistance role.

24

UNDP Bureau for Crisis Response and Recovery. Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) &
Transition Plan, Final Report, September 2010.
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Republic of Albania. Article 7 Report for the year 2010. To the Secretary General of the United Nations
On the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction, June 2010, Ministry of Defence.
http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/%28httpAssets%29/73764454E2A14ED0C12578E3003474A3/$file/Albania
+2010.pdf
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During the second half of 2011, AMMCO focused its efforts on securing approval from
the Ministry of Defence and UNDP to expand its mandate. On 1 November 2011, the
UNDP and Albania’s Minister of Defence signed a Memorandum of Understanding that
formally approved the mandate of AMMCO.27 Section 3 provides a more in-depth
examination of the current context and the process that AMMCO initiated to address
hotspot clearance, ammunition disposal and nation-wide survivor assistance.
GENDER

AMAE has always disaggregated data on victims by sex and age and used it for donor
reports and when developing victim assistance and risk education programmes (eg, to
better target vocational training and employment opportunities for survivors and their
families). Gender equality and participation has also been a consideration when
planning MRE, and establishing anti-mine committees in affected communities.

27

See Annex 5 for a copy of the MoU and Annex 6 for a copy of the UNDP Project Proposal for AMMCO for 20112013.
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HISTORY OF EXTERNAL SUPPORT
UN SUPPORT FOR MINE ACTION

From the outset, the UNDP’s intent was to gradually shift management responsibilities
for AMAE to the government.28
The UNDP covered AMAE’s running costs when it was first established in 1999, and, in
2001, carried out an assessment of mine action capacity and needs. This led, in 2002, to
a two-year capacity project which sought to:
• provide support to AMAC and AMAE
• strengthen mine action information management
• develop a national mine action plan, including policies and guidelines
• develop integrated plans for MRE and risk reduction
• support mine clearance.29
UNDP support for mine action was framed as part of UNDP’s wider programming on
democratic governance and human security in Albania. In the Kukës region, UNDP
implemented weapons for development and local governance initiatives, and tried to
promote synergy among the various projects, including local economic development,
weapon collection30 and control, mine action, preservation of the environment and
natural resource management. UNDP’s Small Arms and Light Weapons Control
Programme and its Support to National Mine Action Programme were also components
of its efforts to promote socio-economic recovery and development in the region.31
Between 2002 and 2006, UNDP provided technical advisors, equipment and funding for
AMAE headquarters and its regional office in Kukës. It also provided technical assistance
for:
•
•
•
•
•

developing the mine action plan,
managing the mine action programme,
improving the mine action information management system,
developing plans for MRE and risk reduction,
supervising survey and clearance operations according to international mine
action standards (IMAS).

In 2002, a UNDP chief technical advisor and an information advisor provided technical
28

UNDP Project Document, AMAP – Support to Completion Programme for a Mine Impact Free Albanian, November
2005 – June 2007.
29
Government of Albania and UNDP. Capacity Building for Mine Action in Albania, ALB/02/001, 27 January 2003.
30
UNDP’s Weapons for Development approach, involving the promotion of voluntary surrender of small arms,
became a flagship of UNDP assistance in Albania.
31
Government of Albania and UNDP. Capacity Building for Mine Action in Albania, ALB/02/001, 27 January 2003.
UNDP remains engaged in Kukës, currently implementing projects on tourism and environmental promotion, and
cross border initiatives with Kosovo.
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support to the AMAE. The following year, an operations advisor from the Swiss General
Staff was seconded to AMAE, and by the end of 2003, there were four technical
advisors. The number of international technical advisors peaked in 2005, when the
UNDP appointed a quality management advisor.
Albania’s mine action programme was nationalised by the end of 2007, with national
staff carrying out all aspects of the mine action programme. The sole exceptions were
the expatriate programme manager for national clearance capacity and DCA’s Quality
Management advisor.
As with all mine action programmes, the quality and effectiveness of technical advisors
varies widely, and each advisor has their own skills and competencies. This was largely
the case in Albania. Overall, UNDP support helped to strengthen AMAE’s
professionalism, capacity and management. UNDP also played a crucial role in
strengthening and building the capacities of state medical institutions at national and
local levels. This was achieved through the provision of adequate technical support and
training, and direct assistance in addressing the socio-economic needs of landmine/UXO
survivors. UNDP also implemented development projects in Kukës, with particular
attention to previously mine-affected villages, thus contributing to overall development
in the area.
UNICEF was also involved in mine action for mine risk education and victim assistance.
In 2004, UNICEF provided funding to the Ministry of Education’s Institute of Curricula
and Studies for the development of teaching modules on mine/ERW contamination
risks, for use in schools nationwide.
The materials were initially piloted in Kukës and, in 2009, the draft curricula were
revised, to include threats from small arms and light weapons, which was framed as
part of a wider range of risks. However, as of September 2011, the curriculum remains
in draft format due to lack of funding for final revision, pilot testing and printing. The
Institute of Curricula maintains it does not have the funds to finish the job. It would not
require significant resources to finalise and print the curriculum however, and it has
been in draft form for several years, indicating that the government does not see the
project as a priority.
UNDP Capacity development project

AMAE developed into a professional and well-run mine action centre. Recognition of
the professionalism of AMAE´s staff and their capacity to effectively manage the mine
action programme was widely acknowledged. UNDP support for AMAE was critical in
this, particularly in regard to funding, which enabled the AMAE Director to manage the
programme and recruit and retain qualified and committed staff. A critical component
of this success was due to the commitment and drive of AMAE´s Director.
The overall aim of the UNDP Capacity Development project was to establish
13

autonomous capacity in Albania, in order to coordinate and monitor mine action
activities in accordance with international standards, with funding from several donors.
The intention was for the mine action programme to be sustainable, self-sufficient,
incorporated within the government and independently managed, with the following
outcomes:
1. Strengthening of national capacity within the mine action programme.
2. Provision of technical support and training to AMAE staff.
3. Support for and overseeing of mine action activities, and monitoring of compliance
with international and UN standards32.
AMAE staff benefited from professional training arranged through the UNDP and ITF
with Cranfield and James Madison universities, as well as on-the-job training and
mentoring provided by UNDP technical advisors. It is clear that AMAE´s capacity
improved substantially, to such an extent that the programme was nationalised by the
end of 2007, and since then, UNDP support has been largely financial and
administrative.
However, one of the main shortcomings of UNDP´s support was the inability to ensure
that AMAE was incorporated within government structures, and receiving financial
contributions from the national budget as originally envisioned. Since completion in
November 2009, AMMCO remains a UNDP DEX project unit for administrative and
financing purposes.
UNDP Completion Initiative

At the end of 2006, UNDP’s Capacity Building project was due to end. However, there
were fears that AMAE would not be able to mobilise sufficient donor support to meet
its clearance obligations on time.
Following discussions with the national mine action authorities, UNDP included Albania
in its Completion Initiative. The purpose of the UNDP Completion Initiative was to
accelerate mine action activities in countries where a concerted effort and a relatively
modest investment of approximately USD 10 million would solve the landmine problem
in a short timeframe (ie 3-5 years). At the same time, it tried to promote national
ownership and ensure sustainable capacity was in place for clearance, survey and
residual contamination problems that may arise beyond treaty deadlines.33
With support from the Completion Initiative, the Government of Albania developed the
Albania National Mine Action Plan for Completion 2007-2010 in December 2006. The
Completion Plan outlined two main strategic objectives:
1. Clear all known Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHA) by 2010.

32
33

UNDP and Government of Albania. Capacity Building for Mine Action in Albania, ALB/02/001, 2001.
Albania National Mine Action Plan for Completion 2009-2010, December 2008.
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2. All landmine/ERW survivors receive medical care and have access to assistance that
leads to full integration into community life.
A memorandum of understanding signed between the government and UNDP in 2007
agreed that UNDP would continue to provide administrative and financial support to
AMAE until the end of 2010.
In effect, the completion plan was Albania’s transition plan. It specified that, following
the closure of the mine action programme in March 2010, the responsibility for mine
action would be transferred from UNDP to the EOD Response Section in the Ministry of
Defence. It also specified that mine action capacities would be integrated into existing
civil protection/defence structures to address residual mine contamination threats, and
into the AAF’s EOD response capacity.34
There was a small reference to the use of technical mine action capacity for EOD
response and for possible UXO and ammunition destruction in other areas of the
country. The plan referred to the transition to the national government and mentioned
that the government was considering further in-kind support (eg premises for AMAE).
According to the plan, by the end of 2010, the mine action programme would be closed.
Despite this, it also alluded to a possible shift in AMAE´s mandate and, in doing so, left
the door open to a future beyond mine action. It specified that mine action capacity
could be used more widely, in, for example:
• the destruction of ERW,
• provision of MRE,
• victim assistance support.
No clear guidance on how this transition should take place was provided, however.
The Completion Initiative was successful in packaging and communicating the Albanian
programme’s achievements, developing a concrete plan for completion, and mobilising
sufficient donor resources to achieve the plan’s objectives.
UNDP Kukës Regional Development Initiative

The Kukës region, located in the northeast of the country, is one of the poorest, with
approximately 37 per cent of the populating living below the poverty line.35
In 2005, the UNDP implemented a three year development programme in Kukës. The
Kukës Regional Development Initiative (KRDI) built on a previous local governance
programme and an Area Based Development Framework for the region. Its purpose
34

Albania, National Mine Action Plan for Completion, 2009-2010.
Andreas Sepp, From demining to area-based development in Albania, UNDP Development and Transition, 2 May
2011, http://www.developmentandtransition.net/Article.35+M51a0d7fc288.0.html

35
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was to provide sustainable livelihoods through rehabilitation and reconstruction of
small community infrastructure. Communities affected by mines/ERW were prioritised,
demonstrating an alignment between mine action and development priorities and
programming.
DANISH CHURCH AID

In 2002, following the closure of its mine action operations in Kosovo, Danish Church
Aid (DCA) transferred its equipment and staff to Albania. From 2004 onwards, DCA was
the sole mine/ERW operator working in Albania with international funding.
DCA played a key role in developing national mine action capacity, to such an extent
that on completion, apart from one expatriate staff member, all personnel were
Albanian, including those responsible for operations and the supervision of
survey/clearance teams. With funding from UNDP, the European Commission and the
US Department of State, DCA trained and equipped six national demining teams, and
administration and logistics staff. DCA also oversaw the managerial and financial aspects
of the teams.
Albania’s 2006 national mine action plan for completion outlined how to deal with
Albania’s remaining mine threat by 2010. It called for the development of National
Clearance Capacity (NCC), which consisted of six demining teams, to replace DCA in the
form of a national non-governmental organisation, when it left Albania. The completion
plan envisaged that, after 2010, when Albania would meet its Article 5 obligations, the
NCC would be integrated into the AAF’s explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) capacity.
However, upon further consideration, DCA discontinued plans to establish the NCC.
Given the small amount of contamination remaining and the bureaucratic challenges
involved in trying to register the DCA teams as an Albanian NGO, DCA decided the effort
would detract from plans to achieve completion by 2010. The 2007 UNDP evaluation
also recommended against establishing NCC, as it would distract Albania from meeting
its Article 5 obligations on schedule.
Following completion in November 2009, DCA implemented a re-training and reintegration pilot project for the 80 technical and 30 support staff left without
employment.36
Throughout 2011 and 2012, DCA was sub-contracted by Sterling International to remain
in Albania and clear UXO hotspots, based on the tasks issued by AMMCO. Thirty-five
national staff and one expatriate are employed, as well as two teams of six operators,
one team leader and two medics. DCA’s teams began identifying and collecting UXO in
36

DCA hired a consultant to undertake a needs assessment and to assess the job market in Kukës. DCA personnel
were allowed to select the type of training they wanted. However, on hindsight, DCA indicated that some
consideration should have been given to strengthening EOD capacity to deal with residual mine, ERW and AXO
contamination. Interview with Anthony Connell, DCA Programme Manager, Tirana, September 2011.
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hotspot areas in November 2011. The transport of the items to disposal areas or their
on-site destruction was supported by the AAF’s EOD teams.37 See Section 3 for more
information.
One concern about DCA’s involvement in UXO hotspot clearance relates to the EOD
training of its demining teams, which is not at the required level for hotspot/battle area
clearance (BAC). DCA has provided some refresher BAC training for the teams, but it will
need to strengthen their EOD capacity to proceed with hotspot clearance.
In September 2011, DCA submitted a proposal for additional funding to the
International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance (ITF), to cover the
costs of a new international EOD advisor to accompany the clearance teams. New
funding in 2012 may make this possible.
DONOR FUNDING

Donor funding steadily increased - peaking in 2005 - as the scale and nature of the
contamination problem became clearer, and AMAE´s capacity to monitor and
coordinate operations improved,.
Albania’s main donors for mine action have been the US Department of State, the
European Union, UNDP and several others.38 A significant amount of this funding was
channelled through the International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims
Assistance (ITF). The UNDP´s Completion Initiative, along with ITF support, helped
Albania mobilise sufficient resources from the international community to meet its
clearance obligations several months ahead of schedule – a significant achievement.
The ICRC also supported training for mine action staff in the areas of prosthetics and
EOD, and the ITF played a critical role, particularly in support of the development of
AMAE´s capacity. The ITF:
• provided training for national staff on quality assurance, quality control and GIS
systems;
• provided equipment for AMAE’s office in Tirana;
• helped fund the establishment of the regional office in Kukës.
These complemented UNDP’s core funding, which provided for staff salaries and
running costs.
The European Union support was also instrumental in ensuring UNDP support to AMAE,
37

An order from the MoD regulates the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in hotspot clearance and
enables AMMCO to coordinate clearance operations and to ensure DCA teams receive MEDEVAC and
communications support.
38
Other donors included ICRC, UNICEF, UNDP, Germany, the United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Switzerland, Canada,
Czech Republic, Sweden, France, Norway and Denmark.
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not only in terms of running costs but also in terms of logistical support and mine
clearance capacity development.

Graph 1. Summary of contributions: 2000–2010 (USD)

Source: Landmine Monitor
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CURRENT STATUS OF THE NATIONAL MINE ACTION
PROGRAMME
ALBANIA MINE AND MUNITIONS COORDINATION OFFICE (AMMCO):
MINE ACTION CAPACITY IN SUPPORT OF DEMILITARISATION
ALBANIA´S DEMILITARISATION PROGRAMME

In January 2012, approximately 26,000 tonnes of excess stockpiled ammunition awaited
disposal in Albania.39 Contamination is widespread in the country, due to:
•
•
•
•

aging ammunition stockpiles,
insecure and improperly managed weapons and ammunition storage depots,
a series of ammunition depot explosions,
looting of weapons and ammunition by civilians.

Nineteen sites have been identified as UXO hotspot areas requiring subsurface
clearance. AMMCO’s preliminary assessments of these areas indicate that the extent of
the contamination and the risk to surrounding communities remains high. Some
emergency clearance was carried out by AAF in these areas, but not to international
standards, and UXO-related accidents occurred after clearance. AMMCO estimates that
hotspot clearance will continue beyond 2013, although all high priority areas should be
cleared by then. Open burning and open detonation (OBOD) of ammunition40 is
currently being carried out by the government in factories in Mjekes, Gramsh and
Polican.
In 2009, the Prime Minister Sali Berisha announced the demilitarisation41 of all
hazardous ordnance. He endorsed an action plan, known as “The Action Plan for the
Elimination of the Excess Ammunition in the Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania”.
The plan outlines a wide programme of activities that focuses on destroying surplus
ammunition by 2013, and reducing the number of ammunition depots located close to
civilian communities.42
The plan refers to five methods of surplus disposal:
• industrial disposal,
• disposal by burning,
• open detonation in demolition sites,
39

Source: AMMCO, February 2012.
Matt Goodyear, Albania makes progress in demilitarisation, Journal of Mine Action, Issue 14.3, Fall 2010.
41
Demilitarisation refers to “…the complete range of processes that render weapons, ammunition, mines and
explosives unfit for their originally intended purpose. Demilitarisation not only involves the final destruction process,
but also includes all of the other transport, storage, accounting and pre-processing operations that are as critical to
achieving the final result.” South-east European Surplus Arms: State Policies and Practices”, Issue Brief, No.1,
November 2010, Small Arms Survey and The Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR).
42
Electronic Mine Information Network, Albania, accessed 25 July 2011.
40
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• shooting, and
• sale or donation.43
Given limited government capacity and resources, the plan relies heavily on external
technical assistance and support. At present, the government has only been able to
mobilise 30 per cent of the funding needed.
Albania is now a NATO member, so it can no longer benefit from demilitarisation
support through the NATO Partnership for Peace modality. Donors have been reluctant
to channel support directly to the Albanian military, and donor meetings that took place
in Brussels in December 2010 and in Tirana in October 2011 were met with a lukewarm
response.
This is also the reason why the Albanian Government requested that the UNDP make
use of the country’s already developed mine action capacity, and that other mine action
partners contribute to the demilitarisation programme. The government expects this to
help mobilise the much needed resources for the demilitarisation programme.
AMMCO´S MANDATE

The UNDP´s BCPR conducted an internal assessment in 2010 to determine whether
AMAE, as the national mine action coordination body, could use its skills and experience
to support the Ministry of Defence with the implementation of the Action Plan on
excess ammunition. The September 2010 assessment report strongly supported this
transition based on the clear need for monitoring and coordination of the safe disposal
of ammunition stockpiles and the survey and clearance of hotspot areas.44 AMAE was
renamed AMMCO, reflecting its new role and mandate, and on 1 November 2011, the
Government of Albania and the UNDP formally agreed to use AMMCO to monitor and
coordinate the clearance of the 19 hotspot areas across the country. Depending on
AMMCO´s success, the Government may also use AMMCO to support wider
ammunition disposal efforts.
AMMCO is responsible for the accreditation, coordination, monitoring and certification
of the hotspot clearance operators. In January 2012, it was also agreed that AMMCO
would be responsible for Quality Management for clearance operations in Gërdec. Up
till this point, surface clearance had been undertaken by AAF and a commercial
operator known as EOD Solutions, but had not been subject to external quality control.
AMMCO is specifically responsible for:
•

Coordinating and monitoring hotspot clearance, risk education and victim

43

South-east European Surplus Arms: State Policies and Practices”, Issue Brief, No.1, November 2010, Small Arms
Survey and The Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR).
44
Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) & Transition Plan, Final Report, UN Bureau of Crisis
Prevention and Recovery, September 2010.
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•

•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

assistance.
Reviewing existing standards on safety, quality assurance and quality control,
community liaison, operations, accreditation and risk education for ammunition
disposal and hotspot clearance and upgrading them to international standards
Developing a standard package for eventual accreditation of private contractors
seeking to operate open burning and open detonation (OBOD) ranges and hotspot
areas.
Conducting a detailed technical assessment of the remaining hotspots.
Developing a plan for clearing all hotspot areas based on the assessment.
Adopting mechanisms for ensuring quality assurance and quality control of hotspots
clearance in assigned locations.
Developing adequate public awareness and risk education mechanisms for local
communities in hotspot areas.
Expanding Albania’s existing victim assistance programme to include ERW survivors
for possible assistance schemes.
Establishing a national database for mines/abandoned ammunition victims
throughout Albania.
Resource mobilisation and liaison with government, in particular the Ministry of
Defence.

AMMCO capacity

AMMCO, like AMAE, remains a UNDP DEX project implementation unit. There are no
plans in place to integrate AMMCO within the Ministry of Defence or any other
government structure or ministry. This is despite the acknowledgment of AMMCO,
UNDP and others that AMMCO should, in theory, be part of the government.
In reality, if AMMCO were integrated into the Ministry of Defence, given the context in
Albania, there is a likelihood that AMMCO´s capacity would dissipate, due to:
•
•
•
•

the risk of losing experienced staff due to reduced pay and benefits,
the command structure within the Ministry of Defence,
limited capacity within the Ministry of Defence,
competing political demands.

Funding and Staff

AMMCO´s projected annual budget for 2012 was USD 400,000. The UNDP Country
Office supported AMMCO salaries and running costs until the end of May 2012, and
UNDP BCPR has pledged a further USD 95,000 thereafter. AMMCO has also initiated
negotiations with the EU for long term funding for both monitoring and hotspot
clearance operations.
AMMCO presently consists of:
• a director,
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• three quality management monitors,
• specialists in mine action, risk education, victim assistance, socio-economic
reintegration and IMSMA,
• administrative staff.
A community liaison officer, an operations officer and, possibly, a public information
officer may also be recruited.
Given its inter-ministerial composition, the Albanian Mine Action Committee will
continue to oversee hotspot clearance. This will complement the board that oversees
the government’s demilitarisation programme, which is currently represented only by
AAF and the Ministry of Defence.
AMMCO activities to date

So far, AMMCO has assessed 16 of the 19 hotspot areas, and has drafted a standard
operating procedure for QA and QC for hotspot clearance. The remaining hotspot
assessments are underway, and the Quality Management team is conducting QA/QC of
DCA’s clearance teams, preparing standards and monitoring templates.
In association with the Albanian Armed Forces and the main implementing partners,
AMMCO has developed a national UXO clearance plan, which is currently awaiting
approval from the Minister of Defence. AMMCO will also be involved in the certification
of clearance operations in Gërdec and will conduct technical assessments of the four
demolition ranges that have been closed. AMMCO has started assessing the first
demolition range.
In association with the ICRC, AMMCO intends to train EOD operators in the AAF in first
aid, and has provided the AAF with three ambulances to date. AMMCO also ensures
that MEDEVAC services are available for DCA and AAF teams in three areas.
The Government of Albania has contributed the following to support UXO hotspot
clearance:
•
•
•
•
•

45

Storage of ammunition collected in UXO hotspot areas in designated AAF depots.
Transport of ammunition to the approved demolition ranges with AAF vehicles.
Disposal of ammunition in the demolition ranges by EOD experts from the AAF
Logistics Brigade.
In-situ destruction of ammunition and components found in the UXO hotspot areas
that are considered too dangerous to transport.
Standby medical evacuation support by helicopter through the AAF45.

AMMCO. UXO Hotspot Clearance in Albania, RASR Meeting 24-25 April 2012, Durres- Albania
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Victim Assistance

There is a national prosthetic and orthotic centre in the capital city Tirana. However, it is
badly managed, and not accessible to persons with disabilities. The centre needs to be
relocated and its managerial capacities further upgraded. AMMCO is working closely
with the wider disability sector in Albania on the ratification of the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD), and intends to:
• conduct a detailed assessment of the physical, medical and socio-economic
conditions of victims injured in abandoned ammunitions accidents , and
• try to replicate the model of the Kukës prosthetic and orthotics workshop in
other regions of Albania.
AMMCO has conducted socio-economic impact assessments for each of the hotspots,
including:
• an assessment of the socio-economic situation of the area surrounding the UXO
hotspots
• risk education, community liaison and victim assistance needs,
• identification of UXO survivors and their medical and socio-economic needs.46
Information management

There are approximately 90,000 persons with disabilities in Albania, but the government
lacks full data on this.
The GICHD’s Information Management Section is assisting AMMCO adapt IMSMAng so
that, in addition to covering mine action, it also covers hotspot clearance and
ammunition disposal. AMMCO intends to migrate all its information on mine victims
into IMSMAng and then include the 699 AXO casualties in the database. Discussions are
also underway to provide the Kukës Regional Council (the first region to digitalise its
cadastral records) with IMSMAng, in order to facilitate regional development planning,
eg land ownership, road development and mapping, identification of mineral resources,
tourist sites and footpaths etc.
One future possibility is to market IMSMAng, with assistance from GICHD, as a tool for
the wider disability sector, for example, in tracking needs and publishing available
services for all people with disabilities in the country.

46

See Annex 9 for a sample socio-economic assessment report.
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TRANSITION TO NATIONAL OWNERSHIP
NATIONAL OWNERSHIP IN THE MINE ACTION CONTEXT

National ownership of a mine action programme is generally reflected through the
following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

A high level of interest and leadership in fulfilling clearance, risk education and
victim assistance obligations.
An empowered mine action authority that is provided with the necessary human,
financial and material capacity.
Efforts made to obtain a clear understanding of the extent of mine/ERW
contamination.
A clear understanding of the size, location and quality of the Article 5
implementation challenge, or a commitment to promptly gain understanding.
A realistic but ambitious plan to complete the implementation of Article 5 as soon as
possible.
Stable and significant national financial support for the mine action programme.
Integration of mine action structures within national and regional government
structures.
Integration of mine action in relevant development strategies, plans and budgets.47

In Albania, progress towards national ownership of the mine action programme has
been mixed. One of the main objectives of the UNDP Capacity Building project was to
have the Albanian government assume full responsibility for the management of the
mine action programme.48 However, the UNDP BCPR assessment noted:
“An important, but largely unfulfilled, promise of the UNDP project was to create a
sustainable, self‐sufficient national mine action capacity, one that is incorporated within
the national government and managerially independent of UNDP. While the project has
47

According to the Cartagena Summit: “The States Parties have come to recognise that strong national ownership is
essential for ensuring that cooperation can flourish. Mine-affected States Parties themselves have remarked that
national ownership in the clearance of anti-personnel mines and other explosive hazards implies, inter alia, the
following five components: (i) high level interest and leadership in fulfilling mine clearance obligations;
(ii) a national authority empowered and provided with the human, financial and material capacity to carry out its
responsibilities; (iii) a clear understanding of the size, location and quality of the Article 5 implementation challenge
or a commitment to promptly acquire such an understanding; (iv) a realistic but not unambitious plan to complete
implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible and; (v) a regular significant national financial commitment to the
State’s own humanitarian demining programme. It has been noted that, while the existence of these components will
not guarantee that resources will flow in response to needs, demonstrating national ownership makes it significantly
more likely that cooperation will flourish between those with needs and those in a position to provide assistance.”
Action 16 of the Cartagena Action Plan recommends that States Parties:
Take full national ownership of their Article 5 obligations by developing, implementing and regularly reviewing
national mine action strategies and associated policies, plans, budget policies and legal frameworks, and inform the
Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies on their implementation.
48
UNDP. Albanian Mine Action Programme (AMAP) – Support to Completion Programme for a Mine Impact Free
Albania (November 2005 - June 2007), http://www.undp.org.al/index.php?page=projects/project&id=69
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made remarkable achievements in terms of the technical capacity of AMAE, it has done
relatively little to incorporate these capacities as a national institution. As previously
noted, there are no laws that establish AMAE as a legal entity in Albania. Even though
AMAE has attained a high degree of technical competence and autonomy, it relies on
UNDP for its operational continuity."49
UNDP capacity building support for AMAE continued until September 2007 when the
chief technical advisor left and, from that point onwards, UNDP support was largely
financial, with some administrative assistance. However, to date, AMMCO remains a
UNDP project implementation unit and is not part of a government structure.
Therefore, the process of transitioning mine action to national ownership did not take
place, at least if national ownership is narrowly defined as the government taking lead
responsibility for establishing a national mine action structure or integrating the mine
action structure in national and regional government structures.
The 2007 evaluation of the Albanian mine action programme dismissed plans for the
relocation of AMAE within the Ministry of Defence, which was unreceptive to the idea.
The evaluation team’s assessment50 reflected that at the time:
•
•
•
•
•

The draft bill to incorporate AMAE within the Ministry of Defence was not high on
the list of legislative priorities.
When the mine action programme ended, AMAE lacked a clearly defined mission
and purpose.
Lower Ministry of Defence staff salaries could prompt AMAE employees to seek
employment elsewhere.
A move to the Ministry of Defence could jeopardise international support.
Focusing on relocating within the Ministry of Defence could result in a loss of focus
on finishing the clearance job by the end of 2009 with only 2 km2 left to clear.

The integration of AMAE within government structures may not have been critical when
the focus was on completion and when a future beyond mine action was not foreseen.
However, now that AMAE expanded its mandate and became AMMCO, its status as a
UNDP project implementation unit remains an issue. This point was also emphasised in
BCPR´s assessment report:
“It is essential that a programme to incorporate AMAE as an Albanian institution with an
official mandate from the Ministry of Defence is undertaken in parallel, to ensure the
sustainability of the organisation and the legitimacy of AMAE to carry out a government

49

UNDP Bureau for Crisis Response and Recovery. Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) &
Transition Plan, Final Report, September 2010.
50
Evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme, GICHD for UNDP, August 2007,
http://www.gichd.org/fileadmin/pdf/evaluations/database/Albania/Report-GICHD-AlbaniaEvaluation-aug2007.pdf.
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mandate."51
Apart from the issue of the integration of mine action structures in government, the
government demonstrated political commitment to resolve the mine/ERW
contamination problem, through:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Support for AMAE and AMAC. The government relied on the UNDP to manage
AMAE, which it regarded as the de facto national mine action centre
The Chairman of AMAC was active in supporting national advocacy and resource
mobilisation efforts.
Active involvement of senior Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Foreign Affairs
officials.
The development of a clear and realistic plan to achieve its Article 5 APMBC
clearance obligations.
Stable in-kind contributions (provision of explosives and MEDEVAC services and
contribution to victim assistance capacities).
Development of national mine action standards.
Integration of mine action in regional development strategies and initiatives.
APMBC implementation legislation enacted in 200652.

In relation to other countries in the region however, national ownership of the mine
action programme is weak. Over the years, it is the UNDP that has kept AMAE/AMMCO
operating. Initially, having UNDP manage AMAE as a project was convenient for the
government and the donors, particularly given the political and economic context at the
time and the relatively small size of the mine action programme. It also enabled AMAE
to get on with its work and not be hampered by internal Ministry of Defence politics and
bureaucracy.
From the perspective of the UNDP and the international community, UNDP support
helped Albania meet its mine clearance obligations, and is now helping Albania address
the problem of UXO contamination resulting from unplanned ammunition explosions.
However, continued UNDP support may have delayed or inhibited the Albanian
Government from demonstrating meaningful ownership.53
51

UNDP Bureau for Crisis Response and Recovery. Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE) &
Transition Plan, Final Report, September 2010.
52
Law No. 9515, The Implementation of the Convention on the Ban of Use, Storage, Production and Transfer of the
Antipersonnel Mines and their Destruction.
53
In the context of development assistance, this situation is known as the Samaritan’s Dilemma where an actor, the
Samaritan, confronts situations in which other actors are in serious need of help and they need to choose between
helping and not helping. The recipient on the other hand has to decide how much effort they will make to help them
in this case. If the Samaritan extends help and the recipient exerts high effort, the Samaritan will benefit substantially
as will the recipient. But from the recipient’s perspective, they could be even better off if they expend minimal effort.
Samaritans are faced with the problem that their dominant strategy is always to extend help. They are better off with
this action no matter what the recipient does. However, once the recipient understands that this is the dominant
strategy for the Samaritan, the recipient’s best response is to expend minimal effort. If the situation is repeated, the
donor may be creating a situation where the recipient loses skill and motivation over time. It is the recipient whose
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At what point should the UNDP either place conditions on future assistance or
discontinue support altogether and encourage the Government of Albania to take full
responsibility for AMMCO?
VICTIM ASSISTANCE AND MINE RISK EDUCATION
Victim Assistance

According to the Cartagena Action Plan, national ownership in relation to victim
assistance consists of:
•
•
•
•
•

High level commitment from the government to address the rights and needs of
people with disabilities.
An empowered national coordination mechanism equipped with sufficient capacity.
A clear plan and legislation to address the rights and needs of people with
disabilities.
Commitment and capacity to implement the plan and legislation, and provide
services.
A national focal point for disability issues.54

Significant progress with victim assistance was made in Albania. Through AMAE´s
efforts, the government leveraged the APMBC to provide support to survivors and
enhance rehabilitation services more widely for all people with disabilities.
Through its Physical Medicine and Rehabilitation (PMR) project, AMAE developed a
sustainable national response to the PMR needs of mine/ERW survivors and people with
disabilities. Albania´s first ever regional prosthetic workshop and physiotherapy centre
was established at the Kukës regional hospital in 2006 and, apart from the first year, the
hospital has been able to cover the salaries and maintenance costs of the facilities,
which now serve people from Kukës and wider Albania. Although AMMCO continues to
help the workshop obtain essential materials from outside Albania, the continued
operation of the workshop and physiotherapy centre and the inclusion of operating
costs within the hospital budget are clear indications of ownership.
Albania has a national strategy and legislation on disability, although its enforcement
remains a problem, as does the level of funding for disability programming. With
support from the UNDP, Albania has drafted a new law on disability to ensure
compliance with the Convention on the Rights of People with Disabilities (CRPD), which
it signed in December 2009 but has not yet ratified.
actions determine whether the outcomes are sustainable or not. However sophisticated Samaritans can try to
condition their aid on meaningful participation and ownership on the part of the recipient. See Elinor Ostrom, Clark
Gibson, Sujai Shivakumar and Krister Andersson. Aid, Incentives and Sustainability. An Institutional Analysis of
Development Cooperation. Main Report. Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University. Sida
Studies in Evaluation, December 2001.
54
See Annex 3 for Recommendations from the Cartagena Action Plan on National Ownership and Victim Assistance
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The Ministries of Health and Labour, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities lack the
capacity to take on AMAE/AMMCO’s coordination function for victim assistance or for
providing financial support and mobilising donor support. Given its limited capacity and
resources for disability issues in general, the government has relied largely on AMAE to
act as the national focal point for victim assistance, and AMMCO will continue to fulfil
this role if funding permits.
Risk education

Albania does not have a committed focal point within the Ministry of Education or other
relevant government institutions for risk education. AMAE has played this role and,
while there is an effective rapid response risk education network, now coordinated by
AMMCO and implemented through ALB-AID and the Albanian Red Cross, this operates
outside government structures.
A mine risk education (MRE) curriculum, developed by the Ministry of Education’s
Institute of Curricula and Studies, was introduced in schools in Kukës as a pilot, and
there were plans to adopt the curriculum in areas where ERW and AXO contamination
remained. However, despite efforts on the part of AMAE and UNICEF to support the
development of educational materials on mine/ERW contamination and small arms and
light weapons, and to have the material integrated within primary and secondary school
curricula, the materials remain untested and in draft form. Although UNICEF provided
funding to the Institute of Curricula and Studies in 2004, the Institute maintains it does
not have the funding to finalise the materials, reflecting a lack of government
ownership.
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PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING THE TRANSITION

In mine action, transition refers to the process through which the UN reduces its
support as the host country develops greater national programme management
capabilities. In some countries, the transition process is marked by specific phases, for
example:
• the development and implementation of a transition plan,
• joint management of the programme,
• the handover and monitoring of the programme.
In Albania, two forms of transition are evident:
1) Completion of mine clearance and phasing down55 of the mine action programme.
2) Using mine action capacity to support armed violence reduction.56
PHASING DOWN THE MINE ACTION PROGRAMME

Albania´s Completion Plan, published in December 2006, signalled that completion of
clearance would be achieved by August 2010 and that the mine action programme
would either be:
1. Closed down, with mine action capacity transferred to EOD response capacity within
the Ministry of Defence and restructured as a humanitarian mine action section; or
else
2. Mine action capacity would be used to address wider security issues.
By the end of 2007, AMAE´s last UN technical advisor had left and UNDP support
consisted mainly of funding and administrative services. While AMAE remained a UNDP
project implementation unit, it was now managed and staffed with a fully nationalised
team. It remained unclear whether AMAE would have a role following completion. The
UNDP evaluation in 2007 therefore recommended that AMAE develop a plan to guide
the closure of the mine action programme. A specific plan to close the programme was
not developed, in part because AMAE and its partners ITF and DCA were considering
expanding its mandate after completion. It was difficult for AMAE to push the issue
further within the government, due largely to its status as a UNDP project unit.
Also, it was not in the interests of AMAE personnel to push the issue. Strategic guidance
and support from the UNDP at this point in time on programme closure and/or
transition options would have been useful. However, the UNDP was focused on
completion of clearance and all issues related to demilitarisation, including excess
55

Phasing down in this context refers to the reduction of project activities in preparation for closure
Armed violence, according to the OECD DAC is ´´ …the intentional use of force (actual or threatened) with arms or
explosives, against a person, group, community or state, that undermines people-centred security and/or sustainable
development´´. This definition apples to both armed violence perpetrated in both armed conflict and non-conflict
settings, and the instruments of armed violence include small arms and light weapons, ammunition, conventional
military equipment, ERW and UXO.
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ammunition and UXO hotspots, were viewed by Albania’s military and the Ministry of
Defence as their strict domain.
The Gërdec ammunition depot explosions in 2008 illustrated how coordination and
technical expertise were needed to address the problem of excess ammunition and AXO
contamination in hotspot areas. Based on this, why didn’t the Albanian Government and
the UNDP make a concrete decision about widening AMAE´s mandate?
In the absence of a clear decision about its future, AMAE began to phase down its
operations in 2010 in preparation for closure by:
•
•
•
•

Donating some equipment to the AAF and transferring some equipment, including
vehicles, to DCA for use in hotspot clearance, based on donor’s agreement57.
Closing the regional office in Kukës in December 2010.
Terminating the employment contracts of non-essential staff .
Making plans to hand over the IMSMA database to the archives section in the
Ministry of Defence.

While AMAE waited for the government’s and the UNDP’s confirmation about its postcompletion mandate, core AMAE personnel were retained and the AMAE office in
Tirana continued to report on key disarmament-related treaty commitments, to
coordinate victim assistance and to provide support to the Albanian Government, which
had assumed the Presidency of the APMBC.
During this period, AMAE´s director spent significant time discussing how mine action
capacity could contribute to the national demilitarisation programme and the action
plan on excess ammunition with the Ministry of Defence, the UNDP Country Office,
donors and other stakeholders. These discussions and a clear decision by the
government should have been made well in advance of completion. With a clear
decision on its future and an official mandate, AMAE would have been able to develop a
clear transition plan with key partners for UXO hotspot clearance and mobilise the
requisite international support well in advance.
USING MINE ACTION CAPACITY TO SUPPORT DEMILITARISATION

Albania´s 2006 Completion Plan stated:
“…In 2005 alone, there were 21 casualties from AXO throughout Albania. Since 2000,
there have been 94 casualties as a result of AXO and, what is most relevant is that the
trend is increasing. In this perspective, it can be considered that the capacities and
methods already developed and currently used in the Kukës Province for the mine
problem can be used for other areas of the country to deal with the remaining ERW
threat.”
57

For example, according to US Department of State regulations, equipment purchased with US government funds
could not be donated to the Albanian military.
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While, on one hand, the plan provided clarity in regard to the remaining area being
cleared, and gave a clear date for completion, it also clearly signalled that there was
scope to use mine action capacity to address AXO/ammunition issues in Albania.
Prior to the March 2008 Gërdec ammunition depot explosions, no concrete discussions
had taken place about using AMAE and/or mine action capacity in Albania to address
wider security threats. In 2005, AMAE, with UNDP support, had carried out a
countrywide data collection project of mine and AXO survivors, and was considering
continuing and expanding its victim assistance programme after completion.
Although the problem of excess ammunition and the risks associated with unsafe
storage in military depots were known prior to Gërdec, ammunition disposal and safe
storage were regarded as strictly military issues. The widespread use and availability of
small arms and light weapons in Albania was also well known.58 Despite this, no explicit
efforts were made by the government or the UNDP to link AMAE and mine action more
generally to wider armed violence reduction initiatives.
The UNDP, and more broadly, the international community could have mobilised efforts
to make a strong case to the Ministry of Defence for using mine action capacity to
support these activities, but failed to do so.
Gërdec was a turning point, and AMAE´s involvement in the response to the accident
planted the seed for further discussions between AMAE, the UNDP, and eventually the
Ministry of Defence – particularly given that there were further ammunition depotrelated accidents following Gërdec. The involvement of AMAE, DCA, ALB-AID and ARC in
the emergency response raised awareness within the government and among donors of
the lack of coordination and EOD capacity within the AAF.
However, AMAE needed the support of Government, in particular the Ministry of
Defence, to approve its expanded mandate, as well as confirmation of financial support
from UNDP. AMAE lacked the political clout to advance these discussions on its own.
While the UNDP was well positioned to push the government to clarify the future of
AMAE, the focus of UNDP support in 2008 and 2009 was on assisting the government to
complete its mine clearance obligations. The UNDP refrained from pushing the
government to ensure that progress, on completion, was not jeopardised.
Furthermore, based on the findings of the 2007 evaluation, the government and the
UNDP agreed to continue with the existing modalities. However, while the UNDP
focused on supporting completion, it could have also, in parallel, pushed for clarity and
a decision from the government on the future role of AMAE which would not have
jeopardised progress on completion.
58

The UNDP had a small arms and light weapons programme, which included a component on Weapons for
Development, which was included the Kukës region.
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Eventually UNDP BCPR responded to requests for support from AMAE and sent a team
in mid-2010 to conduct an internal assessment of AMAE’s capacity to support
ammunition disposal and hotspot clearance. The assessment team strongly supported a
wider mandate for AMAE and provided AMAE with strategic options for achieving this
transition. However, this advice came almost one full year after completion.59
Following the BCPR assessment mission, AMAE prepared a concept note outlining the
rationale for using mine action capacity to support hotspot clearance and ammunition
disposal.60 This was developed by AMAE and the UNDP Country Office, and was shared
with the Ministry of Defence through the Chairman of AMAC and with the main mine
action partners. It provided background on:
the main achievements of the mine action programme;
• AMAE´s potential future role with regards to hotspot clearance and ammunition
disposal
• mine/ERW victim assistance
• risk education and community liaison
• institutional support
• AMAE´s main strengths
In early 2011, following the concept note, AMAE developed a brief implementation plan
on the AMAE transition to hotspot clearance and ammunition disposal.61
The transition implementation plan recognises that AMAE´s mine action capacities;
“…along with the available equipment and infrastructure established during the course
of the mine action programme are assets that can contribute further to demilitarisation
efforts including the hotspots clearance contaminated by Explosive Remnants of War
(ERW) and Abandoned Unexploded Ordnance (AXO).”62
The plan outlines the scope for AMAE´s engagement, along with milestones/next steps
to be undertaken by the UNDP to expand AMAE´s mandate. Specific milestones
mentioned in the plan included AMAE integration with the Demilitarisation Programme
and Development of Ammunition Demolition capacity in AMAE. The transition
implementation plan also includes revised Terms of Reference for core AMAE staff.
59

BCPR did not have the funds to support AMAE beyond March 2010. However, the UNDP Country Office was able to
use leftover EU funds to keep AMAE operating until the end of 2010 (normal funding came to end in March 2010)
and, in 2011, was able to support AMMCO with funds obtained through the One UN Fund.
60
AMAE. Concept Note: Albanian Mine Action Programme Transition, 2010.
61
AMAE, Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the hotspot clearance and ammunition destruction
programme, 2011. See Annex 7 for a copy of the transition implementation plan.
62
AMAE, Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the Hotspots clearance and Ammunition Destruction
Programme, 2011, p.1
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However, the transition plan does not outline specific objectives, anticipated outputs
and outcomes, or address the issues of AMMCO integration in government, phasing
down of AMMCO operations or eventual closure.63
On 1 November 2011, almost two years after completion, the Ministry of Defence and
the UNDP signed a memorandum of understanding that officially approved AMMCO´s
new mandate (see Annex 5). The memorandum of understanding also confirmed in-kind
contributions for hotspot clearance from the government in the form of explosives and
MEDEVAC services for the clearance organisation’s teams. Completion of this transition
has been slow and has met with delays as a result of difficulties getting Ministry of
Defence approval, despite an official request from the Ministry of Defence to UNDP and
its partners to use Albania’s mine action capacity to support the demilitarisation
programme. The delay in getting Ministry of Defence approval partly reflected initial
resistance to AMMCO’s involvement in ammunition disposal.
The Completion Initiative was successful in helping Albania access the resources needed
to finish the job, but UNDP support at that time did not fully consider the wider role of
AMAE. Even though completion was in sight by the end of 2006, little had been done by
the UNDP to plan for the closure of AMAE or the expansion of its mandate. These
discussions should have been anticipated and planned for well in advance as part of a
well-conceived transition plan. Instead, little consideration was given on the potential to
use mine action capacity to address a wider range of threats. Although the need for this
form of assessment was highlighted in the 2007 UNDP evaluation, nothing took place
until 2010, when the BCPR assessment took place and a transition plan was
developed.64 The UNDP came through with funding for a reduced level of
AMAE/AMMCO operating costs in 2011 and 2012, based on requests from the Ministry
of Defence to use mine action capacity to support the demilitarisation programme.
A more detailed plan to guide the closure of the mine action programme and its
transition to AMMCO developed in association with key stakeholders (UNDP, Ministry of
Defence, donors), could have helped clarify the different options regarding AMAE’s
future (eg closure vs AMMCO) at an earlier juncture, and the steps required to realise
the transition. It could have also put pressure on the government and the UNDP to
formally support the transition without jeopardising progress on completion.
Based on AMAE´s experiences, AMMCO should develop a detailed plan which addresses
the issues of integration in government, phasing down operations and eventual closure.
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See Annex 11 for a copy of the transition implementation plan.
“A more technical assessment is required along with a thorough assessment of how AMAE as a mine action
coordination body can transfer its skills and experience to the Ministry of Defence to assist in these issues, if this is
what the government of Albania desires.” Evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme, GICHD for UNDP,
August 2007, p.36
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KEY FINDINGS AND LESSONS LEARNED
•

INDIVIDUALS MATTER: AMAE was fortunate to have a director who worked,

with UNDP support, to recruit and retain a professional and committed team, draw
upon the experience of international technical advisors and mobilise donor support.
This resulted in a successful and well-respected mine action programme. His vision
and drive, and the commitment and professionalism of his team, played key roles in
AMAE´s transition to AMMCO.
•

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP: National ownership in mine action is a complex

issue. What degree of national ownership is required? Should the mine action
programme be integrated in government structures and run by a government body,
even in countries with relatively small contamination problems?
In the context of Albania, it could be argued that the government had sufficient
ownership to meet its Article 5 obligations. Having the UNDP manage AMAE was
useful, as it helped safeguard mine action resources and capacity. In a context
where weak governance and limited capacity are realities, the potential negative
consequences of having AMAE based within the Ministry of Defence seemed to
outweigh the positive, ie:
•
•
•

•
•

AMAE would have been viewed as a government programme instead of a
UNDP initiative.
It may have prompted the government to increase its financial commitment
to mine action.
However, AMAE would have to operate under the MoD chain of command
and be subject to greater turnover of staff, weak management and lack of
capacity within the MoD. The risk of a diversion of resources for other
Ministry of Defence priorities would have increased.
It is likely that AMAE´s staff would have either left or risked being replaced.

NATIONAL OWNERSHIP CAN TAKE MANY FORMS: Ownership should

not be defined simply as integration in government structures, although this is an
important component. Albania is one of the few countries that had a contamination
problem, established national structures to address the problem, harnessed
international support to build its national capacity, developed realistic plans, and got
the job done ahead of time and with a fully national team. Albania also made
significant strides in putting in place sustainable systems and structures for physical
and medical rehabilitation for mine/ERW survivors and, more generally, for people
with disabilities. AMAE remained a UNDP project implementation unit but it
received sufficient government support and commitment to enable it to achieve all
that it did.
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•

INTEGRATION IN GOVERNMENT AND SUSTAINABILITY: With the

closure of the mine action programme and the transition of AMAE to AMMCO, the
questions of national ownership and integration into the government remain.
AMMCO’s future is at risk as long as it depends on the support of the UNDP and its
partners for funding. A more sustainable solution is required; one that requires
AMMCO to transition itself into government, be it as an independent government
entity or as a unit within a department, despite the risks this may entail. Ultimately,
if the government values AMMCO´s expertise, it will take the necessary means to
secure its sustainability and effectiveness. AMMCO needs to develop a clear strategy
that clarifies integration options, phasing down of operations and eventual closure.
•

PLANNING FOR CLOSURE: At a certain point, it is important to start thinking

about completion and closing down the programme. Phasing down operations
should be based on a clear plan. For example, consider:
o What will happen to the equipment and vehicles, taking into consideration
the different donor regulations? What should be considered when closing
regional offices, when terminating staff employment contracts, organising
re-training and benefits? Who will take over the mine action database?
o In regard to re-training and the re-integration needs of deminers,65 if there is
a need to use mine action capacity to support armed violence reduction
initiatives, then consider offering deminers the opportunity of technical
training to contribute to these wider strategic programmes (eg, EOD).
o Are there actors beyond mine action, who could use and benefit from
IMSMA? For example, consider sharing IMSMA with local and regional
authorities to support development planning.
•

PLANNING FOR TRANSITION: In the Albanian context, two main transitions

took place – the closure of the mine action programme and the transition of AMAE
to AMMCO, and the use of mine action capacity to support wider security issues.
Neither took place according to well-developed transition plans, and both took place
in a context of uncertainty about AMAE´s future. A clear transition plan, developed
in consultation with key stakeholders can:
o help provide clarity regarding various scenarios and the steps required to
realise each
o mobilise government and donor support
o provide staff with greater clarity on their futures
•

UNDP SUPPORT FOR COMPLETION AND TRANSITION: With support

from the UNDP Completion Initiative, the capacity of AMAE was strengthened to the
extent that by the end of 2007, the programme was nationalised, donor support
remained, and completion of Albania´s Article 5 APMBC clearance obligations was
65

See Annex 8 for a summary of DCA´s lessons learned from its pilot re-training and re-integration project.
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met ahead of schedule – significant achievements. The Completion Initiative
highlighted the need for a programme evaluation which, in 2007, recommended the
need for a detailed plan to phase out the mine action programme. The Completion
Initiative should have also included clearer guidance on programme exit and closure,
or use of mine action capacity to support AVR programming. The UNDP BCPR
internal assessment undertaken in 2010 provided useful strategic guidance to AMAE
and the UNDP. However, it should have been conducted well in advance of
completion to provide sufficient time for assessing the context, investigating
different options and reflecting these in transition planning.
•

USING MINE ACTION CAPACITY TO SUPPORT ARMED VIOLENCE
REDUCTION: In some countries, mine action capacity can and should support

wider programmes that focus on armed violence reduction (AVR) (peace building;
small arms collection and destruction; ammunition disposal; disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration; physical security and stockpile management;
community safety, etc). In Albania, there was a clear need for the capacity and
expertise that had developed through the national mine action programme, and it
was logical to make use of it, particularly after the closure of the mine action
programme. Using mine action capacity to support AVR requires forward thinking,
vision, and outreach. Conducting an assessment of the wider context can help
identify opportunities and entry points.
Box 2. Extract - Lessons learned in Albania by ITF, DCA and AMAE 66
1. It is crucial for all stakeholders, national authorities and mine action centres, operators and donors to
have a commonly defined vision and goal. Furthermore, results are to be assessed and discussed jointly
as well as presented on regular basis.
2. National ‘ownership’ (of the programme) is very important for successful completion of clearance
operations. When planning for national capacity building, the time framework, full commitment, clear
benchmarks and sustainable funding need to be clearly defined from the start of the process.
3. Unlike some programmes, which close-down because of lack of funding or poor quality and/or
insufficient programme value, the Albanian Mine Action Programme terminated only when the job was
completed and Albania could be declared ‘mine free’. Nevertheless, even after this point there is a need
for residual capacity dealing with potential EOD-calls, as well as for the structure that would be able
coordinate this capacity.
4. The IMSMA database must be finalised before closing of the clearance operations as well as
transferred to the most appropriate ministry or entity so that it can be readily available if information
from the database is needed. This step should ideally be defined well in advance.
5. All staff should be informed of closure plans from the beginning and in a transparent manner. Staff
should also be informed of any plans beyond clearance completion, if applicable.
6. During the last phases, operations must remain tightly controlled and monitored to prevent any
66

International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, DCA and AMAE, Demining Albania, November
2009, p.19-20
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breakdown in discipline, productivity or safety practices.
7. Close liaison among the local Mine Action authority, operators and donors should be maintained to
ensure a common understanding of the clearance process and progress. Equally (if not more) important
is the communication and liaison with local communities. The communities need to be kept informed
throughout the clearance operations as well as during the close-down phases. The need for the post
clearance impact survey is of immense importance also to ensure that the land cleared and handed-over
is indeed used thus proving the local population gained confidence and trusts the clearance efforts and
operations executed.
8. Based on realistic planning, the concrete figures substantiated by results must be transparently and
constantly presented to donors. This ensures continuous donor interest and re-affirms their belief in the
joint vision for the mine (and cluster munitions) free Albania.
9. Advocacy efforts are crucial to ensure that focus is maintained on the remaining problem during the
last years of clearance. If focus wavers there is always a threat that donors will slowly loose interest and
shift their priority focus to other areas or regions, at a point when the contamination reduction is
moving into the final stages.
10. Transparency of the use of donor funds through actual results achieved must be constantly fulfilled
at all phases of a mine action programme.

37

BIBLIOGRAPHY
ALB-AID. Needs Assessment Report on the risks posed by the ammunition demolition (UXOs and
ERW) in 5 open demolition centers of Albania, January 2011
Albanian Mine Action Executive
• Concept Note: Albanian Mine Action Programme Transition, 2010
• Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the Hotspots clearance and Ammunition
Destruction Programme, 2011
• The Albanian Mine Action Programme. Transition of Mine Action Capacities to Clearance of
ERW/AXO and Stockpiled Ammunition Disposal, 14th International Meeting of National Mine
Action Programme Directors and UN Advisors, Presented by Arben Braha, March 2011
• The Albanian Mine Action Programme. Transition of Mine Action Capacities to Clearance of
ERW/AXO and Stockpiled Ammunition Disposal. APM Standing Committees Meetings Geneva,
Presented by Veri Dogjani, 20-24 June 2011
Albania Mines and Munitions Coordination Office (AMMCO). Technical Assessments of Hotspots in
Albania. Arben Braha and Franz Baer, August 2011.
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Implementation Support Unit, GICHD. Assisting Landmine and
other ERW Survivors in the Context of Disarmament, Disability and Development, 2011.
Center for Peace and Disarmament Education and Saferworld. Turning the page: Small arms and light
weapons in Albania, December 2005
Danish Church Aid. Re-training and Re-integration Pilot Project. Albania. Final Report, April 2011.
Eaton, Robert, Chris Horwood and Norah Niland, “Study Report: The Development of Indigenous
Mine Action Capacities,” DHA 1997.
European Union. Evaluation of EC-Funded Mine Action Programmes in South East Europe, 20022007. GICHD, December 2009.
Goodyear, Matt. Albania makes progress in demilitarisation, Journal of Mine Action, Issue 14.3, Fall
2010.
Government of Albania.
• Declaration of Completion of Implementation of Article 5 of the Convention on the Prohibition
of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction, Albania, 30 November 2009.
• Action Plan on Elimination of Excess and Out of Need Ammunition According to the Table of
Organization and Equipments of the Armed Forces, Approved With the Order of the Minister of
Defense No.1924, dated 30/12/2009
• Albania National Mine Action Plan for Completion Fulfilling the obligations under Article 5 of the
Antipersonnel Mine Ban Treaty 2007-2010, December 2006.
International Campaign to Ban Landmines.
• Landmine and Cluster Munitions Monitor, Country Profiles – Albania, 2000-2011.

38

•

The importance of residual demining capacity after a declaration of full compliance with Article
5 of the Mine Ban Treaty, ICBL Statement, 22 June 2011

International Trust Fund for Demining and Mine Victims Assistance, DCA and AMAE, Demining
Albania, November 2009.
Levinger, Beryl and Jean McLeod, “Hello, I must be going: Ensuring quality services and sustainable
benefits through well-designed exit strategies,” EDC, October 2002.
NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). Update on NATO Trust Fund Project for Munitions
Disposal in Albania. Presented by Arben Kotobelli for the RASR workshop, May 2011
Small Arms Survey.
• Scraping the Barrel: The Trade in Surplus Ammunition, Issue Brief 2, April 2011.
• Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites, Research Note, May 2011.
Small Arms Survey and The Regional Approach to Stockpile Reduction (RASR). South-east European
Surplus Arms: State Policies and Practices”, Issue Brief, No.1, November 2010.
UNDP Bureau for Crisis Response and Recovery. Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive
(AMAE) & Transition Plan, Final Report, September 2010.
UNDP and Government of Albania. Capacity Building for Mine Action in Albania, ALB/02/001, 2001.
UNDP. Evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme, GICHD, August 2007
US Department of State and Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement. Dangerous Depots: The
Growing Humanitarian Problem Posed by Aging and Poorly Maintained Munitions Storage Sites. Fact
Sheet produced by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, Summer 2010.

39

ANNEX 1 – TIMELINE OF KEY EVENTS
1999

2000
2001
2002

2003
2004

2005
2006

2007

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•

2008

•
•

2009

•
•
•

2010

•

2011

•
•

2012

•
•
•

Albanian Mine Action Committee (AMAC) founded
AMAC establishes the Albanian Mine Action Executive (AMAE)
Survey undertaken by AAF and consultants commissioned by CARE International
Albania ratifies APMBC (February)
RONCO begins demining operations under guidance of AMAC (June)
Stockpile destruction commences through NATO Partnership for Peace initiative (January)
UNDP assessment of mine action in Albania (September)
UNDP Capacity Building project starts
Stockpile destruction complete (April)
National mine action planning workshop (June)
National Mine Action Plan developed for 2003-2005
DCA starts operations in Albania following the closure of its Kosovo programme
Swiss Operations Advisor starts (May)
UN provides Operations Advisor, CTA and UN volunteer for victim assistance
FSD leaves due to lack of funding (March)
HI leaves after fatal accident during training session in Kukës, leaving DCA as sole operator
in Albania (May)
UNDP Technical Survey Project
Rapid Rural Appraisal conducted by UNDP and AMAE in affected districts of Kukës
Revision of National Mine Action Strategy (August)
Development of National Mine Action Plan for Completion (2007-2010) through UNDP
Completion Initiative; completion forecast for 2010
National Mine Action Legislation is adopted (June)
UNDP Evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme; Evaluation finds that AMAE
and UNDP did not make significant progress in obtaining commitment from the
Government of Albania to integrate AMAE (August)
AMAE Capacity Building completed and reduced international expertise (UNDP
CTA/Programme Manager departs)
Plans to establish National Clearance Capacity abandoned
Gërdec Ammunition depot explosion (March), AMAE and DCA involvement in rapid
response, clearance and support to survivors; a turning point for AMAE
AMAE revises National Mine Action Plan for Completion (2009-2010)
Albania completes APMBC Article 5 obligations, nine months ahead of scheduled deadline
(November)
Government announces Action Plan to deal with the problem of excess ammunition,
however no decision taken on the future of AMAE
UNDP Assessment of the Albanian Mine Action Executive and Transition Plan
recommends the use of AMAE capacity to support wider demilitarisation, in particular
involvement in monitoring and coordinating the clearance of UXO contamination resulting
from unplanned ammunition depot explosions (September)
Still no decision taken by the Government on the future of AMAE
Ministry of Defence and UNDP sign Memorandum of Understanding on 1 November
which officially widens mandate of AMAE (renamed Albania Mines and Munitions
Coordination Office - AMMCO) as coordination body for hotspots clearance
AMMCO secures funding from UNDP Country Office until April 2012
AMMCO secures UNDP BCPR pledge for funding beyond May 2012
AMMCO initiates negotiations with the European Union on longer term funding

•

AMMCO remains UNDP project implementation unit; no decision taken by Government
on integration of AMMCO in government

ANNEX 2 – PEOPLE INTERVIEWED
Name

Organisation

Position

Jonuz Kola

ALB-AID (formerly VMA)

Director

Arian Starova

AMAC

Deputy Minister of Defence

Arben Braha

AMAE

Director

Juliana Buzi

AMAE

Mine Action Specialist

Veri Dogjani

AMAE

Victim Assistance Expert

Blerta Cani

ARDF

Director

Anthony Connell

DCA

Programme Manager

Stefano Calabreta

European Commission

Former UNDP CTA

Halil Radogoshi

GICHD

Systems Support Officer

Kerry Brinkert

GICHD ISU

Director

Paramdeep Mtharu

GICHD ISU

Implementation Support Officer

Edlira Sina and Dr. Tidita
Abhurrahmani

Institute of Development of
Education (formerly Institute of
Curricula)

Specialist and Director

Gregor Sancanin

ITF

Project Manager

Sabina Beber Boštjančič

ITF

Head of Department for International Relations

Emin Ferati and Leze Korbi and Fadil
Shehu

Kukës Hospital

Director and staff from the Prosthetic workshop and
Physiotherapy centre

Arben Kotobelli

NAMSA

Project Supervisor

Eva Veble

NPA (formerly DCA)

Shefqet Bruka

Regional Council, Kukës

Former DCA Mine Action Head
Former Regional Councillor and AMAE QM
Supervisor

Franz Baer

Swiss Government

AMAE/AMMCO Operations Advisor

Melanie Reimer

UNDP

Former Victim Assistance Advisor

Vladimir Malkaj

UNDP

UNDP Cluster Manager

Reuben McCarthy

UNICEF

Previously with UNDP BCPR

Murph McCloy

US Department of State

Advisor

ANNEX 3 - DEFINING NATIONAL OWNERSHIP IN THE MINE
CLEARANCE CONTEXT
Cartagena Summit:
“The States Parties have come to recognise that strong national ownership is essential for ensuring that
cooperation can flourish. Mine‐affected States Parties themselves have remarked that national ownership
in the clearance of anti‐personnel mines and other explosive hazards implies, inter alia, the following five
components:
(i) high level interest and leadership in fulfilling mine clearance obligations,
(ii) a national authority empowered and provided with the human, financial and material capacity to carry
out its responsibilities,
(iii) a clear understanding of the size, location and quality of the Article 5 implementation challenge or a
commitment to promptly acquire such an understanding,
(iv) a realistic but not unambitious plan to complete implementation of Article 5 as soon as possible and,
(v) a regular significant national financial commitment to the State’s own humanitarian demining
programme.
It has been noted that, while the existence of these components will not guarantee that resources will flow
in response to needs, demonstrating national ownership makes it significantly more likely that
67
cooperation will flourish between those with needs and those in a position to provide assistance.”
Action 16 of the Cartagena Action Plan recommends that States Parties:
Take full national ownership of their Article 5 obligations by developing, implementing and regularly
reviewing national mine action strategies and associated policies, plans, budget policies and legal
frameworks, and inform the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine
Action Technologies on their implementation.
At the June 2010 meetings of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Standing Committees, it was
proposed that “national ownership in relation to victim assistance could comprise the following six
elements:
a) a high level commitment to addressing the rights and needs of mine victims and other persons with
disabilities
b) a national coordination mechanism empowered and provided with the human, financial and material
capacity to carry out its responsibilities
c) a comprehensive plan and legislation to address the rights and needs of persons with disabilities
including mine victims
d) a regular, significant commitment to implement the policy, plan and legislation and to provide services
e) capacity to implement the policy, plan and legislation or steps taken to acquire the resources necessary
to build this capacity
f) a national focal entity for disability‐related issues68

67

Final Report of the 30 November – 4 December 2009 Second Review Conference of the States Parties to the
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their
Destruction, Part II: Review of the Operation and Status of the Convention 2005-2009, paragraph 169.
68
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban convention Implementation Support Unit, GICHD. Assisting Landmine and other ERW
Survivors in the Context of Disarmament, Disability and Development, 2011, p.55-56.

ANNEX 4 – SUMMARY OF TRANSITION-RELATED
RECOMMENDATIONS FROM 2007 UNDP EVALUATION
The following is brief summary of the key findings, recommendations and lessons learned identified in
UNDP’s 2007 evaluation of the Albanian Mine Action Programme, which relate specifically to the issues of
national ownership, transition, capacity development and programme closure.
•

Develop a comprehensive detailed plan for the phase-out of the programme.

•

Capacity development is more than training staff and establishing standards for the technical
implementation of a program. Technical capacity and institutional capacity are very different and
require different plans, approaches and skills. Management, including financial and institutional
capacity development is equally important and more critical for the long term sustainability of the
organisation or institution. It is good management that gains donor confidence more than technical
capacity.

•

National capacity development takes time, patience, commitment and sustainable funding.

•

It is not essential to establish a national mine action centre for every programme. The size of the
landmine problem, including its overall impact on the country and not just the region or regions
where the landmines are located, should be factors in determining the structure and management of
the programme. For example, if it takes three years for a national mine action centre to achieve a
level where it is capable to manage the problem, and the remaining landmine problem requires just
another three years, is it worth the time, effort and risk to establish the mine action centre as an
autonomous agency to finish the job? At what point does striving towards a point when international
advisors can be decreased or phased out become a distraction to finishing the job? At what point
should the national government be held to ensuring the security of its people and required to take
ownership of the mine action programme?

•

Real government ownership of mine action and the affects of landmines will be demonstrated
through long term sustainable support for landmine survivors through government structures,
policies and new laws affecting people with disabilities.

•

Long term capacity development and government ownership should be planned for during the
emergency phase of a program. This may require a two-prong approach with different staff: one to
implement the emergency phase and the other to plan for the long term stabilisation of the program
with government ownership being the primary focus.

•

Closing down a programme is the most difficult task of all. It is not easy and it is usually painful as
staff morale plummets in such situations. Unlike some programs that close because donors stopped
funding them or the program was of poor quality and value, the Albanian Mine Action Program can
stand tall and leave knowing they did the job and made Albania mine free, and reduced new
accidents and victims to zero and the programme closed because it was successful. Still, like a start
up, closing a program needs a strategy and a plan.

•

The database must be finalised before closing and it must be transferred to the most appropriate
ministry or entity. One criterion for identifying a location for the database would be future ease of
access.

•

The programme can close out in phases and the close out plan should include tasks, dates and
persons responsible.

ANNEX 5 - MOU BETWEEN UNDP AND MOD

ANNEX 6 – UNDP PROJECT PROPOSAL 2011-2013

ANNEX 7 – AMAE TO AMMCO TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION
PLAN (EXTRACT)
Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the Hotspots clearance & Ammunition
Destruction Programme
The Kosovo armed conflict of 1999 contributed to the land contamination of about 120 sq km along the
Albanian northeast border with mines and cluster munitions.
The Government and the donor community have swiftly responded to this situation by backing the
establishment and consolidation of adequate responsible institutional structure, Albanian Mine Action
Executive- AMAE, capable of coordinating and monitoring a comprehensive humanitarian mine action
programme in line with UN international standards.
The Government of Albania recognizes the crucial role that the United Nations Development Programme,
with the support of the international community, has played to the successful implementation of the
Albanian Mine Action Programme, leading to remarkable achievements in mine clearance, victim
assistance and mine risk education. It is mainly due to this support that Albania could proudly declare the
country free of landmines and cluster munitions in November 2009, fulfilling in anticipation an important
international commitment on demilitarization. In particular, we highly appreciate UNDP’s support in the
development of sustainable capacities of the Albanian Mine Action Executive - AMAE through direct
financial and technical assistance. UNDP Albania has played a lead role in developing and sustaining the
above structure as well as in securing resources and partnerships and guiding the humanitarian demining
programme progress until its successful end.
AMAE’s role has been critical for such an achievement, with a unique contribution to coordination and
monitoring, adoption of quality assurance and quality management in the implementation of
internationally recognized mine action standards as well as an exemplary partnership and resource
mobilization strategy.
These capacities along with the available equipment and infrastructure established during the course of
the mine action programme are assets that can contribute further to demilitarization efforts including the
hotspots clearance contaminated by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Abounded Unexploded
Ordnance (AXO).
During its existence, AMAE has also established a broad international network and built the confidence
through transparent reporting and effective coordination, established sound accreditation procedures
and operated as a reliable national accreditation body for Mine Action, and also set up, with the support
of GICHD, a unique information management system which has been already adapted to demilitarisation
and hotspot clearance programmes.
In recognizing AMAE’s built capacities and experience to date, we believe that such capacities are very
relevant and valuable to our current demilitarization priorities. As we are already aware, one of Albania’s
current challenges is the disposal of a large stockpile of aging weapons and ammunition in possession of
the Albanian Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defence has outlined a Plan of Action for Elimination of
Excess Ammunition in the AAF with the aim to utilize national capacities to dispose of all surplus
ammunition by 2013. Furthermore, the hot‐spots contaminated with abandoned unexploded ammunition
are identified as an additional threat, until these are cleared in compliance with relevant international
standards.

To this purpose, in order to make the best use of AMAE’s technical expertise, equipment and
infrastructure established with valuable donors’ funding and UNDP’s support, I would like to express our
willing to engage this professional structure to contribute through a similar institutional arrangement and
role, inclusive of its know-how in mine victim assistance and risk education/community liaison activities,
in the area of hotspots clearance and ammunition disposal, so as to help ensure that these components
are brought up and carried out in accordance with the International Humanitarian Standards.
Based on this experience, the strategic support and contribution to the ammunition stockpile destruction
would contain the following components/tasks:
1. Review existing safety and quality standards for ammunition disposal and hotspots clearance and
upgrade them to international standards
2. Develop an accreditation standard package for eventual private contractors seeking to operate OBOD
ranges and hotspot areas;
3. Conduct a detailed technical assessment of the hotspots contaminated areas in order to prepare the
relevant clearance plans;
4. Adopt mechanisms for ensuring quality assurance and quality control of OBOD activities and hotspots
clearance in assigned locations;
5. Develop adequate public awareness and risk education mechanisms for local communities;
6. Expand existing mine action victim assistance programme to include and benefit nationwide ERW
survivors for possible assistance schemes;
7. Establish a national database for mines/ abandoned ammunition victims survivors throughout
Albania;
8. Contribute in resource mobilization for ammunition stockpile destruction and hotspots clearance
through furthering partnerships as well as by introducing best practice experiences through UN’s
global network;
9. Support the Albania Government to fulfil its annual transparency reporting obligations under the
various related Conventions;
10. Support the Albania Government to fulfil its Presidency role at the Tenth Meetings of States Parties
to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention;
Milestones & Immediate next Steps
The following milestones indicate the next steps to be undertaken by UNDP CO for the involvement of
AMAE in the national demilitarization plan along with extending its mandate in mine action during this
extension period:
Milestone 1: AMAE Integration with Demilitarisation Programme
 UN Country Team meeting to discuss programme and collaboration.
 Donor meeting including the EC delegation to gauge interest and raise support for AMAE
engagement in Demilitarisation Programme.
 Inclusion of United Nations as official partner in ‘Demilitarization Plan’ of the government.
 Inclusion of AMAE in Demilitarization Committee of the MOD.
 Expand mandate of AMAC (or merge with National SALW Commission) in support of Demilitarization
as inter-ministerial liaison body and support to Demilitarization Committee.
 Extend Government MOU with UNDP in mine action and revise to include Demilitarization.
 Draft PRODOC for signature with government and UNDP.
 Inclusion of Demilitarization in CPAP, UNDAF, and One UN Programme to promote human security
and development.
Milestone 2: Development of Ammunition Demolition capacity in AMAE.
 AMAE training in EOD, ammunition transportation and demolition, IMSMA V (MySQL).
 Follow up offers of in-kind assistance by Swiss government and others.
 Recruitment of Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Ammunition Specialist.
 New staff TOR to include EOD/ammunition , especially for QA officers
 Redeploy AMAE Kukës (IMSMA & equipments) to Tirana during the extension period.









Activation of IMSMA V and development of Ammunition Module.
Develop work plan and strategic goals for OBOD, hot-spots, standards development and quality
management.
Revise Community Liaison strategy, standards and procedures.
Revise Risk Education messages, strategy, standards and procedures.
Develop national OBOD and EOD accreditation and licensing standards, in consultation with MoD,
NAMSA, and others.
Develop national ammunition transportation and demolition standards, in consultation with MoD,
NAMSA, and others.
Develop QA/QC operating procedures, in consultation with MoD, NAMSA, and others.

ANNEX 8 - DCA´S LESSONS LEARNED FROM ITS PILOT RETRAINING AND RE-INTEGRATION PROJECT
The following are some of the key lessons learned by DCA from its pilot re-training and reintegration project implemented in Albania in 201069:

•

There is a need to have an international specialist supervise a re‐integration project, who
must work full time on the project to ensure hands‐on management in a continuous manner
and smooth cooperation between all project stakeholders – both internal and external

•

Planning with the target group needs to start 12 months prior to the close down of a
program to ensure smooth transition between full‐time employment and a sustainable re‐
integration effort

•

Liaison with the key stakeholders should commence 9‐12 months prior to the close down to
ensure their needs are fully met

•

It should be explored to combine generic skills training for the whole target group (e.g.
household financial management, basic accounting) with an individualised, demand driven
re‐training program

•

In order to ensure the timely availability of re‐training courses to target group members, the
initial re‐training questionnaire should only include courses which are already on offer by a
qualified re‐training provider

•

A demand drive re‐training process should always be coupled with realistic employment
prospects, supporting hands‐on skills development and supplementary income generation
potential within a relatively short timeframe

69

Danish Church Aid. Re-training and Re-integration Pilot Project. Albania. Final Report, April 2011.

ANNEX 9 – SAMPLE TECHNICAL HOTSPOT ASSESSMENT

ANNEX 10 – SAMPLE HOTSPOT SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT
REPORT

SOCIO- ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT OF HOTSPOTS
Hotspot: Ura e Gjadrit/Mali i Rrezume (Shkoder)
Date of Assessment: 27 October 2011

_____________________________________________________________
__
General Data Region

Shkoder

District
Commune
Village
Point of Contact

Vau i Dejes
Vig-Mnele
Mali i Rrezume
Mr. Mark Ngoci ; + 355 68 34 53 544 (head of
Quarter)
Mr. Sander Nikolli; 355 6
Mr. Pjeter Lleshi ; +355 6
Low Medium High
Direct: 380 inhabitants
Indirect : 2,150
6 injured and two dead

Socio‐economic impact
Number of beneficiaries
Number of casualties (Injured, Dead)

1. Situation
Mali i Rrezume village is part of the Vig - Mnele Commune in the region of Shkoder. The
distance from Vau i Dejes is around 5 kilometer and the road is new and in good condition. The
village has around 380 inhabitants. There is no health post and medical personnel in the village.
The army depots have been located At Mali i Rrezume village where several types of
ammunition had been stored. During the uprising in Albania in 1997, civilians looted the
ammunition storage site of the village Mali i Rrezume. There were a number of explosions in
1997 at this army depot, which resulted in the complete destruction of the site and created a
UXO contamination of the surrounding area. The AAF made a surface clearance of the area.
Today the site contains still unexploded ordnance and remnants of ammunition, posing a real
threat to local inhabitants. There is also a demolition pit within the area that needs to be
cleared from any remnants of ammunition.
The hotspot area lies close to Gjadri riverbed. The area can be reached by driving through the
town of Vau Dejes (Puka road) and then following direction Hajmeli and crossing the bridge of
the river Gjadri. In the back of these basements lies a steep hill and another dirty road leads to a
well visible stone quarry. This quarry is located well within the hazardous area. On the opposite
site of these three basements, there is another basement, backed by a small hill.
In April 1997, there was an explosion in the army depots in Mali i Rrezume village. There have
been accidents in the village in 1997; six injured people and two fatalities. Based on the filed

visits and contacts with local inhabitants and officials, not all the injured people are reported
and registered in AMMCO database.
The Albanian Armed Forces conducted clearance during 1998-1999 within the areas of the
military compound and the surrounding areas.
The locals confirmed that while digging in their land, they occasionally find items spread from
the explosion. In addition, explosions are heard in case of fire in the surrounding areas of the
army depots. Local inhabitants are currently searching for scrap metal in the army depots.
It is important to mention that there are no warnings signs or any billboard to just keep local
inhabitants aware of the danger present in the zone.
The main incomes and employment opportunities in the village are from cultivating the land
and animal husbandry. Emigration is common too. The arable field used by the inhabitants is
considerable and the local inhabitants are trying to make use of every section of land in their
possession. They are cultivating: maize, corn, etc and grazing the animals. The majority of the
arable fields are accessed by irrigation water.

2. Further action and steps recommended
2.1 Risk Education/Community Liaison:
•

Due to the very serious threat at this hotspot, a billboard with Risk Education messages
should be installed immediately. Visible and accurate marking should be done

•

Media materials should be produced and distributed to local people.

•

Community meetings/liaison activities, collection of information from locals for the
presence of ammunition in the area.
2.2 Victim Assistance:
•

An in depth and detailed assessment should be made with survivors and their families,
to identify and address their needs.

•

Since the clearance company (DCA) will conduct clearance operations in the hotspot,
the emergency and surgical capacities at Regional Hospital (either Lezha or Shkodra)
need to be examined.

•

Fill in the IMSMA form for any not reported incidents.

ANNEX 11 – AMAE TRANSITION IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
Implementation Plan on the AMAE transition to the Hotspots clearance & Ammunition Destruction
Programme
The Kosovo armed conflict of 1999 contributed to the land contamination of about 120 sq km along the
Albanian northeast border with mines and cluster munitions. The Government and the donor community
have swiftly responded to this situation by backing the establishment and consolidation of adequate
responsible institutional structure, Albanian Mine Action Executive- AMAE, capable of coordinating and
monitoring a comprehensive humanitarian mine action programme in line with UN international
standards.
The Government of Albania recognizes the crucial role that the United Nations Development Programme,
with the support of the international community, has played to the successful implementation of the
Albanian Mine Action Programme, leading to remarkable achievements in mine clearance, victim
assistance and mine risk education. It is mainly due to this support that Albania could proudly declare the
country free of landmines and cluster munitions in November 2009, fulfilling in anticipation an important
international commitment on demilitarization. In particular, we highly appreciate UNDP’s support in the
development of sustainable capacities of the Albanian Mine Action Executive - AMAE through direct
financial and technical assistance. UNDP Albania has played a lead role in developing and sustaining the
above structure as well as in securing resources and partnerships and guiding the humanitarian demining
programme progress until its successful end.
AMAE’s role has been critical for such an achievement, with a unique contribution to coordination and
monitoring, adoption of quality assurance and quality management in the implementation of
internationally recognized mine action standards as well as an exemplary partnership and resource
mobilization strategy.
These capacities along with the available equipment and infrastructure established during the course of
the mine action programme are assets that can contribute further to demilitarization efforts including the
hotspots clearance contaminated by Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) and Abounded Unexploded
Ordnance (AXO).
During its existence, AMAE has also established a broad international network and built the confidence
through transparent reporting and effective coordination, established sound accreditation procedures
and operated as a reliable national accreditation body for Mine Action, and also set up, with the support
of GICHD, a unique information management system which has been already adapted to demilitarisation
and hotspot clearance programmes.
In recognizing AMAE’s built capacities and experience to date, we believe that such capacities are very
relevant and valuable to our current demilitarization priorities. As we are already aware, one of Albania’s
current challenges is the disposal of a large stockpile of aging weapons and ammunition in possession of
the Albanian Armed Forces. The Ministry of Defence has outlined a Plan of Action for Elimination of
Excess Ammunition in the AAF with the aim to utilize national capacities to dispose of all surplus
ammunition by 2013. Furthermore, the hot‐spots contaminated with abandoned unexploded ammunition
are identified as an additional threat, until these are cleared in compliance with relevant international
standards.
To this purpose, in order to make the best use of AMAE’s technical expertise, equipment and
infrastructure established with valuable donors’ funding and UNDP’s support, I would like to express our

willing to engage this professional structure to contribute through a similar institutional arrangement and
role, inclusive of its know-how in mine victim assistance and risk education/community liaison activities,
in the area of hotspots clearance and ammunition disposal, so as to help ensure that these components
are brought up and carried out in accordance with the International Humanitarian Standards.
Based on this experience, the strategic support and contribution to the ammunition stockpile destruction
would contain the following components/tasks:
1.

Review existing safety and quality standards for ammunition disposal and hotspots clearance and
upgrade them to international standards
2. Develop an accreditation standard package for eventual private contractors seeking to operate OBOD
ranges and hotspot areas;
3. Conduct a detailed technical assessment of the hotspots contaminated areas in order to prepare the
relevant clearance plans;
4. Adopt mechanisms for ensuring quality assurance and quality control of OBOD activities and hotspots
clearance in assigned locations;
5. Develop adequate public awareness and risk education mechanisms for local communities;
6. Expand existing mine action victim assistance programme to include and benefit nationwide ERW
survivors for possible assistance schemes;
7. Establish a national database for mines/ abandoned ammunition victims survivors throughout
Albania;
8. Contribute in resource mobilization for ammunition stockpile destruction and hotspots clearance
through furthering partnerships as well as by introducing best practice experiences through UN’s
global network;
9. Support the Albania Government to fulfill its annual transparency reporting obligations under the
various related Conventions;
10. Support the Albania Government to fulfill its Presidency role at the Tenth Meetings of States Parties
to the Eleventh Meeting of States Parties to the AP Mine Ban Convention;

Milestones & Immediate next Steps
The following milestones indicate the next steps to be undertaken by UNDP CO for the involvement of
AMAE in the national demilitarization plan along with extending its mandate in mine action during this
extenions period:
Milestone 1: AMAE Integartion with Demilitarisation Programme
•
UN Country Team meeting to discuss programme and collaboration.
•
Donor meeting including the EC delegation to guage interest and raise support for AMAE
engagement in Demilitarisation Programme.
•
Inclusion of United Nations as official partner in ‘Demilitarization Plan’ of the government.
•
Inclusion of AMAE in Demilitarization Committee of the MOD.
•
Expand mandate of AMAC (or merge with National SALW Commission) in support of
Demilitarization as interministerial liaison body and support to Demilitarization Committee.
•
Extend Government MOU with UNDP in mine action and revise to include Demilitarization.
•
Draft PRODOC for signature with government and UNDP.
•
Inclusion of Demilitarization in CPAP, UNDAF, and One UN Programme to promote human
security and development.
Milestone 2: Development of Ammunition Demolition capacity in AMAE.
• AMAE training in EOD, ammunition transportation and demolition, IMSMA V (MySQL).
• Follow up offers of in-kind assistance by Swiss government and others.
• Recruitment of Explosive Ordnance Disposal/Ammunition Specialist.
• New staff TOR to include EOD/ammunition , especially for QA officers
• Redeploy AMAE Kukes (IMSMA & equipments) to Tirana during the extention period.

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Activation of IMSMA V and development of Ammunition Module.
Develop work plan and strategic goals for OBOD, hot-spots, standards development and quality
management.
Revise Community Liaison strategy, standards and procedures.
Revise Risk Education messages, strategy, standards and procedures.
Develop national OBOD and EOD accreditation and licensing standards, in consultation with MoD,
NAMSA, and others.
Develop national ammunition transportation and demolition standards, in consultation with MoD,
NAMSA, and others.
Develop QA/QC operating procedures, in consultation with MoD, NAMSA, and others.

In view of the above, an extension until the end of February 2011 would be beneficial to a proper
conclusion and/or transition of this programme to most effectively benefit current country priorities.
In mine time we are finalizing the project proposal in order to obtain the bridge funds from UNDP BCPR
(100.000 USD) were UNDP CO contribution is foreseen as the cost share to this project.
In consideration of the above reasons, we would appreciate receiving your concurrence and approval of
such a request for extension.
Key Staff Terms of Reference
1. National Director and Project Manager
The AMAE Director is responsible to the AMAC Chairman for the execution of the following duties:
• Advise AMAC on International policy and assist in the formulation of a National Action Plan;
• Assist with and compile clearance and OBOD priorities and present them to AMAC for confirmation;
• Provide the secretariat for AMAC;
• Responsible for the formulation and execution of strategic and operational plans for AMAE.
• Co-ordinate and control all ERW/AXO clearance and OBOD Programme in Albania through the AMAE;
• Manage the AMAE in respect of all matters including personnel, information, planning, operations,
standards, training, logistics and finances;
• Maintain the ERW/AXO information database on a daily basis;
• Compile monthly reports on ERW/AXO Action and reports on all visits regarding ERW/AXO Action
activities for distribution to AMAC, UNDP and other interested parties;
• Provide accurate information to the press and media in consultation with AMAC;
• Provide advice, planning and relevant training to the AMAE personnel regarding ERW/AXO Action,
RE, Victim Assistance, quality management and ERW/AXO surveys;
• Ensure through AMAE the quality management of all ERW/AXO Action in Albania;
• Liaison with the international community, local communities and all authorities regarding ERW/AXO
Action;
The AMAE Manager will make no policy decision without consulting with UNDP CO and AMAC;
2. Programme Specialist
The Programme Specialist is responsible to the AMAE Director for the execution of the following duties:
• Provide support and advice in the establishment of reliable mechanisms for ensuring that ERW/AXO
related information are processed through appropriate channels and eventually received by the
AMAE IMSMA database.
• Drafting several plans, and related documents as required to support AMAE activities;
• Ensure all the necessary data for AMAE Management during the preparation of briefing documents
for the resource mobilization;
• Collect and consolidate monthly reports on separate activities of the AMAE and the implementing
partners;

•
•
•

Prepare progress reports, briefings and presentations for various donors as required;
Prepare the annual plans and reports for the Programme;
Collect data and draft the report for the Albanian Government as required under Article 7 of the AP
Mine Ban, Cluster Munitions and CCW Conventions;

•

Support the AMAE Director in preparing the periodic reviews of the National Mine Action
Portfolio(Victim Assistance/Rick Education and post clearance activities) and Ammunition
destruction, Hotspot Clearance programmes;
Support in preparing various project proposals for submission by AMAE to various international
donors;
Prepare briefing materials on the Programme as required by Government for
participation/contribution to eventual international meetings/events.

•
•

3. Victim Assistance & Risk Education Coordinator
The Victim Assistance & Risk Education Coordinator is responsible to the AMAE Director for the execution
of the following duties:
• The VA and RE Coordinator is an active member of the AMAE and coordinates and monitors all RE
and VA activities conducted under this programme and implementing partners in Albania;
• Liaise and coordinate with other agencies, local authorities, and organizations for RE and VA activities
in order to encourage synergies and avoid any overlap of project ideas;
• Provide regular updates to the RE and VA strategies for Albania;
• Contribute to the preparation of the National Standards and SOPs for the RE and VA components;
• Coordinate all RE and VA activities in Albania;
• Maintain a database of all Risk Education and Victim Assistance activities conducted in Albania by all
agencies;
• Based on IMAS, provide appropriate guidance and standards for Risk Education and VA in Albania to
implementing partners and coordinate their activities (ICRC, UNICEF, ITF, UNDP, Ministry of Health,
Ministry of Education, MoLSAEO, National Trauma Center (and NPOC), Regional Hospitals, HI, ALBAID and Albanian Red Cross );
• Participate in the monthly Coordination meetings and present a monthly summary of RE and VA
activities;
• Ensure RE and VA organizations provide regular reports on their activities to the AMAE;
• Do advocacy and resource mobilization for RE and VA projects;
• Collect data and draft the report for the Albanian Government as required under respective articles
of the AP Mine Ban, Cluster Munitions and CCW Conventions, in relation to the Victim Assistance.
4. IMSMA Specialist
The IMSMA Specialist is responsible to the Operations Officer for the execution of the following duties:
• Assist the establishment of the IMSMA capability and formulate a work plan for data gathering,
entering, collation and dissemination of ERW/AXO & EOD information;
• Liaise with other agencies and NGOs regarding ERW/AXO clearance & EOD information and regularly
update partner organizations in IMSMA and GIS matters;
• Prepare data, statistics and graphics to support reporting and recording requirements of AMAE, the
Albanian Government, donors, and other clients with mine action related information;
• Assist in preparing task dossiers for all survey and clearance & EOD tasks in Albania;
• Secure and control the software in the AMAE Office;
• Administrate the IMSMA database/GIS component for the AMAE Office, including data entry,
mapping, data quality and database back-up;
• Receive all system related reports and enter them into the IMSMA system along with preparing
appropriate hard copy files;

•

Generate reports, data sets, etc required to produce task dossiers for ERW/AXO clearance agencies
as directed by operations;

5. Admin/Finance Assistant
Under the direct supervision AMAE Executive Director, the Admin/Finance Assistant will administer and
execute processes and transactions ensuring high quality and accuracy of work. She will work in close
collaboration with the UNDP CO to exchange information and ensure consistent service delivery. She will
be responsible for project operational support in the area of Finance, Human Resources & Administration.
- Human Resources
• monitor and keep record the attendance of project staff and annual leave, prepare the relevant
monthly and annually attendance reports;
• provide human resources services for benefits administration and social insurance, including
preparation of the Requests for Contract for project staff and follow up for PO approval;
• TA preparation for project staff, keep record in Atlas and follow up for PO approval;
• Arrange appointments and assist in making travel arrangements;
• Assist in the recruitment procedures processes, checking the conformity with the AMAE/UNDP rules
and procedures;
- Finance
• Prepare Request for Payments and ensure the supporting documents are available and in accordance
with AMAE/UNDP rules;
• Follow all financial and administration requirements for the recording and registering of all financial
transactions as required by AMAE/UNDP regulations;
• Prepare the draft of budget revision for the approval from AMAE Director and assist in the budgetary
control;
• Participate in drafting the new project work plan and reports;
• Assist in preparing quarterly and annual work plans and budgets;
• Prepare progress financial reports to be submitted to UNDP and donors;
- Administrative and Logistics
• Prepare and assist in the preparation of relevant procurement procedures for goods and consultancy
services, prepare bidding papers in accordance with UNDP requirements, including RFP, RFQ,
Vacancy Announcement, Contract, arrange project procurement actions within the thresholds,
monitor and process the data in Atlas for procurement (enter requisitions and follow up the
payments);
• Maintain a stock control and supply system for all office consumable items;
• Ensure and make arrangements for the regular service and maintenance of all AMAE/UNDP vehicles.
Certify work done, carrie out quality check and control all relevant documentation including logbook
and vehicle history files for all AMAE vehicles;
• Ensure all logistical aspects of the AMAE Office are satisfied including the proper functioning of office
utilities (e.g. electricity, water supply, etc.) and liaise with the landlord on all issues;
• Control and secure all equipment of the AMAE Office are operational;
• Maintain AMAE/UNDP Inventory records and report regularly to the AMAE Director & UNDP CO;
• Maintain administration systems including a register and filing system for all incoming and outgoing
correspondence at the AMAE Office;
• Ensure fuel replenishment requisitions, vouchers and consumption;
6. AMAE Professional Driver
The Driver is responsible to the AMAE Administrative Officer for the execution of the duties contained in
this TOR.
• He will take direction from AMAE Director as required.

•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•

Collects and delivers mail, pouches and other communications from and to government agencies, UN
agencies and other institutions.
Drives the office vehicle for the transport of authorized personnel and delivery and collection of mail,
document and other items.
Responsible for day to day and preventative maintenance of all AMAE vehicles and generators,
checks oil, water, battery, brakes tires and perform minor repairs and arranges other repairs and
ensures that the vehicle is kept clean.
Advises on servicing schedule of all AMAE vehicles and generators and report any major faults.
Logs all official trips, daily mileage, fuel consumption, oil changes, greasing, etc.
Ensures that the steps required by the rules and regulations are taken in case of involvement in an
accident.
Any other tasks as requested by the Director AMAE or the Chief Technical Advisor.
Perform all duties as directed in UNDP/AMAE rules and regulations.
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